IMF-脆弱的线索：撒哈拉以南非洲的排斥与冲突（英）-2024.1.docx

<RV'INTERNATIONA1.MONETARYFUNDFrayingThreads:ExclusionandConflictinSub-SaharanAfricaHanyAbdel-1.atif5MahmoudEl-GamalWP/24/4IMFWorkingPapersdescriberesearchinprogressbytheauthor(三)andarepublishedtoelicitcommentsandtoencouragedebate.TheviewsexpressedinIMFWorkingPapersarethoseoftheauthor(三)anddonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheIMF,itsExecutiveBoard,orIMFmanagement.WoRK-NGPAPER2024JANWP/24/4©2024InternationalMonetaryFundIMFWorkingPaperAfricanDepartmentFrayingThreads:ExclusionandConflictinSub-SaharanAfricaPreparedbyHanyAbdel-1.atif,MahmoudEl-Gamal*AuthorizedfordistributionbyVitaliyKramarenkoJanuary2024IMFWorkingPapersdescriberesearchinprogressbytheauthor(三)andarepublishedtoelicitcommentsandtoencouragedebate.TheviewsexpressedinIMFWorkingPapersarethoseoftheauthor(三)anddonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheIMF,itsExecutiveBoard,orIMFmanagement.ABSTRACT:Thisstudyinvestigatesthefactorsleadingtoexclusionandtheirdetrimentalimpactsinsub-SaharanAfrica(SSA).Itemploystwo-levelsofanalysis:amacro-levelestimationoftheinfluenceofexclusionandmarginalizationonviolentconflict,andamicro-levelinvestigationidentifyingthetriggersofexclusionsentiments.Weconstructstatisticalsummariesfrommultiplemeasuresofexclusion,producinganoverallexclusionindexaswellassocial,economic,andpoliticalexclusionsub-indices.OurresultsshowtheimportanceofmitigatingexclusionandmarginalizationwithinSSAnations,andpinpointthemosteffectivepolicyleversthatgovernmentsmayusetominimizedestabilizingfeelingsofexclusion.RECOMMENDEDCITATION:Abdel-1.atif,H.,&El-Gamal1M.(2024).FrayingThreads:ExclusionandConflictinSub-SaharanAfrica(IMFWorkingPaperNo.24/4).InternationalMonetaryFund.JE1.ClassificationNumbers:D74,D63,055,015,P48Keywords:Sub-SaharanAfrica;Conflict;Socialexclusion;Politicalexclusion;EconomicexclusionAuthor'sE-MailAddress:habdel-latifimf.ora:elaamalrice.eduImfworkingpapersFrayingThreads:ExclusionandConflictinSub-SaharanAfricaWORKINGPAPERSFrayingThreads:ExclusionandConflcitinSub-SaharanAfricaHanyAbdel-1.atif5MahmoudEl-Gamal1TheauthorswouldliketothankDamienCapelle1AntonioDavid,1.ucEyraud1GlenKwende1NicolaPierri1SaadNoorQuayyum1andAlunThomas,forhelpfulcommentsonearlierdraftsofthispaper.INTERNATIONA1.MONETARYFUNDContents1 Introduction52 ConflictinSub-SaharanAfrica:AContext73 ExclusionandConflictinThe1.iterature114 ANewExclusionIndex135 DataandMethodology186 EmpiricalResults216.1 TheEffectsofExclusiononConflict216.2 TheMainDriversofExclusion267 Conclusion29AppendixA32FrayingThreads:ExclusionandConflictinSub-SaharanAfricaHanyAbdel-1.atifa*,MahmoudEl-GamalbaIntemationaIMonetaryFundbRiceUniversity1. IntroductionSub-SaharanAfrica(SSA)isaregionthatsuffersfromincessantconflictsandpersistentunderdevelopment.Animportantfactorincausingtheseconflictsandunderdevelopmentisexclusion.Wefollowthecommondefinitionofexclusionasaconditionorprocesstlroughwhichcertainindividualsorgroupsaresystematicallydeniedaccesstorights,opportunities,orresources,whichmaybeavailabletoothersegmentsofthepopulation.1Perceptionsofexclusionmaybemagnifiedbyastate'sfailuretoprovidebasicpublicservicesacrossdisparateregionssufficientlyand/orequitably.Unequalaccesstocleanwater,food,healthcare,education,andeconomicopportunitiescanmagnifyfeelingsofexclusionamongmarginalizedpopulations.Theseperceptionsofexclusion,inturn,mayleadtosocialstrifethatdisruptsanation'sgrowthefforts.ThisconsiderationisparticularlyimportantforSSA,becauseeconomicdevelopmentintheregionhasbeenconsistentlyderailedbypersistentconflicts.Theseconflictswereinpartinheritedfromtheregion'scolonialpast,buttheyremainfueledbyethnic,religiouszandtribaldifferencesthathavemagnifiedproblemsforpost-colonialnationstates.Whetherornotperceptionsofexclusionareindeedjustified-inotherwords,whetherornottheyareresultsofintentionallydiscriminatorypolicies-theyincreasethefrequencyandintensityofconflictsthathaveadverseeffectsoneconomicperformance.Therefore,ouranalysesarefocusedonperceptionsofexclusionandtheircorrelatesatthemacro-andmicro-levels,withoutdelvingdeeplyintopoliticalandsocialanalysisoftherealityorcausesofdiscriminatorypolicies.TheviewsexpressedherearethoseoftheauthorsanddonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheIMF,itsExecutiveBoard,orIMFmanagement.Correspondingauthor:habdel-latifimf.orgForexample.UnitedNations(2016)definessocialexclusionas“astateinwhichindividualsareunabletoparticipatefullyineconomic,social,politicalandculturallife,alongwiththeprocessleadingtoandmaintainingsuchastate,z.WorldBank(2013)highlightsthedynamicnatureofexclusionanditsroleinhinderingmeaningfulparticipationinsociety.ThemeasuresofexclusionthatweconstructinthispaperwillbeshowntocorrelatesignificantlywithclassificationofsomeSSAcountriesintothecategoryofFragileandConflict-affectedStates(FCS).TheWorldBank2023listoffragileandconflicta*cctcdstatesincludesthefollowing17sub-SaharanAfricancountries:BurkinaFaso,Burundi,Cameroon,CentralAfricanRepublic,Chad,Comoros,RepublicofCongo,DemocraticRepublicofCongo,Ethiopia,Eritrea,Guinea-Bissau,Mali,Mozambique,Niger,Nigeria,SouthSudan,andZimbabwe.ThestudyalsocoversMauritaniaaspartoftheSahelregion.Countriesinthiscategoryhaveexperienceddisproportionatelymanyhumanitariancrisesanddisplacements.Theseeventshave,inturn,impededthesecountries'socialandeconomicdevelopment.WeaimtoidentifytherootcausesofongoingturmoilintheseSSAfragilestatesbystudyingtheroleofsocial,political,andeconomicexclusioninsparkingconflicts.Thisapproachdoesnotdenytheimportanceofothersupranationalconflictdeterminantssuchasclimatechangeordisputesovernaturalresources.Ourfocusmerelyaimstohighlighttheimportanceofperceptionofexclusionasacauseofconflictandtoidentifyitscausesatthemicro-levelinordertohelpSSAgovernmentsindevisingpoliciesthatareconducivetoeconomicstabilityandgrowth.Weconductourempiricalanalysisatthefollowingtwolevels:Atthenationallevel,Weexplorehowperceptionsofexclusion-economic,social,orpolitical-contributetoconflictandinstability.Werecognizethepossibilityofendogeneityissues,particularlytheinfluenceofconflictinengenderingexclusionarysentiment.Toaddresspotentialreversecausalityconcerns,ourempiricalmodelemployslaggedexplanatoryvariables.Byanalyzingdatafromprioryearsfortheexclusionvariable,Wearguethatconflictsattimetareunlikelytohaveimpactedpreviouslevelsofexclusion.Inthisregard,perceptionsofexclusioncreateafertileenvironmentforarmedgroupstoCaP让alizeonthediscontentofmarginalizedindividuals,therebyfuelingviolence.Weshowempiricallythattheseintra-statedynamicsofmarginalizationexertamoresubstantialinfluenceonconflictlikelihoodthanmerepovertyoreconomicunderdevelopmentalone.Attheindividuallevel,weusesurveydatatoidentifythesocioeconomicandgovernancefactorsthatcultivatefeelingsofexclusion,thussuggestingpotentialframeworksforpolicyinterventionsaimedatmitigatingconflict-inducingalienation.Atleastsincethe1970szscholarshaveexpresseddissatisfactionwithstandardoverallpovertymeasures.Researchersthusintroducedmultidimensionalmeasuresofpovertyandlaterintroducedmeasuresof“exclusion,“whichwashypothesizedtocontributemoresignificantlytodissatisfactionandsocialunrest.Thispreviousliteraturegenerallyusedadhocweightedaveragesofvariousmeasuresofexclusion.Weusefactoranalysistoconstructourindicesofexclusioninastatistically-systematicandmeaningfulway.Thestructureofthispaperisasfollows:Section2providesanoverviewofconflictinSSA.Section3offersaliteraturereview.Section4introducesourPerceptionofExclusionIndex(PEI)anditssub-components.Section5describesthedatasetandoutlinestheempiricalmethodology.Section6presentsourfindings.Section7offersabriefdiscussionofpolicyimplicationsandconcludingremarks.2. ConflictinSub-SaharanAfrica:AContextThesecuritysituationinmanySSAcountriesisacutelyproblematic,asexemplifiedmostrecentlybyescalatingviolenceanddisplacementinSudan.Sincetheturnofthemillennium,intermittentlypersistentconflictshavecausedseverehumansufferingandeconomicdestabilizationthroughouttheregion.Conflictsoftenbeginwithisolatedoperationsofextremistgroups,butquicklyexpandintoregionalviolencethatspreads,likeavirus,fromonesubregiontoanother.Non-statearmedfactionscontinuetostagelarge-scaleattacksoncivilianandmilitarytargets.Inmanycases,thisviolencereflectsdisputesoveraccesstonaturalresources,territorialdominance,andregionalinfluence.Weshowthatintranationalfeelingsofsocial,economicandpoliticalexclusionalsoplayanimportantrole.Theextantliteratureidentifiesaplethoraofconflict-inducingfactorswithinSSAcountries,particularlyfocusingontheSahelregionwhereinviolentconflictshavebeenparticularlyconcentrated.Climaticfluctuationsandfoodinsecurityhavealsobeenparticularlyacuteinthissubregion.Morebroadly,SSAstandsastheglobalepicenteroffoodinsecurityworldwide.Forecastsfor2023indicatethatnearly142millionindividualsintheregionwillconfrontacutefoodinsecurity,markinga12percentelevationfromtheprecedingyear.Overone-thirdoftheseindividualshavesuccumbedtoacutefoodinsecurityfollowingtheoutbreakoftheCOVID-19pandemic.Overlongertimehorizons,climatechangehasexertedadetrimentalimpactonagriculturalproductivity,therebyprecipitatingadeclineinincomeandassetvalues.Thishasintensifiedthedistressingtrendsofmalnutritionandfoodinsecurityintheregion.SSA'sFSCareparticularlysusceptibletoexogenousperturbations,suchasclimaticshocks.Recentresearchrevealsthatfragilestatesmayincurcumulativeoutputlossesamountingtofourpercentinthewakeofsevereclimaticevents,comparedtoonepercentlossinothernations(Jaramilloetal.z2023).Suchlossescancriticallyhamperanation'sresilienceagainstfutureshocks,andtheresultingstrifeoftenspreadsbeyondnationalboundariesandlastsforseveralgenerations.IntheparticularlybadlyimpactedSahelsubregion,theproportionofpeoplefacingacutefoodinsecurityhassurgedthreefoldintheprecedingthreeyearszsoaringsignificantlyfrom3.6millionto10.5million.AccordingtotheGlobalHungerIndex,Chadisfacingan“alarming“levelofhungerseverity,whileotherSaheliannationsareexperiencing"serious“levels.Additionally,theprevalenceofundernourishmentinChadismarkedlyelevatedincomparisontoitsSaheliancounterparts.Floodsand,moreimpactfullyzdroughtshavebeenthemainnaturalcalamitiesintheSahel.During2021-22,thesubregionenduredmultiplegraveclimaticoccurrences.Inparticular,Chadsufferedunprecedentedflooding,whileNigerwitnessedadevastatingdroughtthatledtosubstantialreductioninagriculturaloutput.Thus,climatechangehasplayedasignificantroleinexacerbatingmalnutritionandfoodinsecurityintheregion.TheseclimaticchallengeshavethusamplifiedtheviciouscycleoffragilityandconflictinSSA.Inthisregard,therehasbeenamarkedincreaseinthefrequencyandseverityofconflictsinSSAinrecentyears.ThenoticeableriseinfatalitiesduetoconflictshascoincidedW让hnumerouscoupattempts,especiallysince2020,c.f.Fig.1.Figurelashowsthesignificantincreaseinrecordedconflictincidentsthatinvolvedfatalities,comparedto2010(note:2023dataisincompleteatthiswriting).Therewere42z653fatalitiesrecordedin2022,amassiveincreasefrom11,686in2012,and6z755in2010.Thisincreasereflectsastaggeringincreaseof531.8percent.Morebroadly,conflictincidentshaveincreasedsignificantlyto27,330in2022/from5z497in2012and2z483in2010zmarkinganincreaseof1000.4percent.Inparticular,conflictwithintheSaheliansubregionUnderWentaparticularlysignificantincreasein2022,aggravatingextantmacroeconomicandsocialproblems.Thenumberofrecordedincidentsjumpedfrom4z170in2021to6z120in2022,ariseofnearly20percentfromanalreadyhighbase.Inaddition,thenumberofrecordedfatalitiesincreasedbyastaggering34percent,from6z610in2021to10z740in2022.TheseSalielianincidentsin2022wereconcentratedinBurkinaFasoandMali.Overall,fortypercentofSub-SaharanAfricaiscategorizedaseitherfragileorconflict-ridden.FigureIbshowsthefrequencyofcoupattemptsintheSSAregionbetween2010and2023.Post-2020,theregionhaswitnessed10successfulorattemptedcoups,signalinganotableescalationaftertwodecadesofrelativestability.Interestingly,someofthesecoupshavehadsignificantpopularsupport,suggestingwidespreaddissatisfactionW让hthepreviousrulingregimes.Figurel:SSAFragileStatesConflictIncidentsandFatalities,1999-2023SSA:ConflictIncidentsandFaUIities,2010-2023Source:AC1.EDandauthors,calculations.Notes：1.atestdata19-08-2023.(b)SSA:NumberofCoupAttempts.2010-2023Althoughalltypesofconflicthaveincreased,violenceagainstcivilianshasincreasedparticularlystrongly,c.f.Fig.2.Thetrendtowardincreasedviolence,especiallyagainstcivilians,suggeststheurgentneedtopayattentiontoconflictprevention.Thisisparticularlyimportantinlightofthepronouncedincreaseinrebelgroups'involvementinconflicts,especiallynoticeablesince2018.Thistrendmaysignalgrowingdissatisfactionandfragmentationwithinpoliticalandsocialstructures,requiringurgentattentiontoaddresstheunderlyingcausesandpreventfurtherescalation.TheSalieliansubregionsufferedaparticularlyharshincreaseinviolenceduring2022.Forexample,therehasbeenasignificantescalationincombatencountersanddetonationsinBurkinaFaso,andNigerwitnessedariseincivilian-targetingviolence.ThehighestproportionofconflictincidentsinvolvinginsurgentfactionswasrecordedinBurkinaFasozMali,andNiger.Borderareas,particularlythetri-borderbetweenBurkinaFaso,Mali,andNiger,referredtoas1.iptako-Gourmazhasbeenaperpetualtargetforactsofterrorismandoperationsofviolentextremistgroups,c.f.Fig.3.TherewasasurgeinconfrontationsbetweentheIslamicStateintheGreaterSahara(ISGS)andJamazatNusratal-Islamwal-Muslimeen(JNlM)earlierthisyear.ThemostrecentinstabilityintheeasternSahelregionofSudanfurtherexacerbatesthesituation,asconflictsthatwerepreviouslyrestrictedtotheSahelspreadtothebroaderAfricanstage.Figure 2: ConflictTypesandMainActors,2010-2023（八）(b)SSA:ChangesinConflictTypes,20102023SSA:ChangesinConflictActors,20102023BaWes-Explosions-Proeeets-KOSSotenceagaiEdviIiaECtviiensWenbtyMihtias-Protesters一ExternalForcesPolrt*caiMiintas-RebelGroups一SourceAClEOairm'c4kU>0H4Nodm1.MMl<MUQg2023.ZtrSleQCde<etoome<m't<MnotKiOuMSource:AC1.EDandauthors,calculations.Notes：1.atestdata19-08-2023.R>olersStateForces2qd00U-SmoConflictseemstobeconcentratedprimarilynearnationalborders.Theseborderregionsoftenlacksufficientprovisionofpublicservices,creatingwhatareknownasungovemed(orungovernable)spaces.Tlteseconflict-pronehotspotsposesubstantialriskstosecurityandstability,bothinthedirectlyaffectedcountriesandtheirnearbyneighbors.Notableexamplesofconflictswithpotentialcross-borderspillovereffectsincludetherecentcivilwarinEthiopiaandthelong-runningconflictsinSouthSudanandCentralAfricanRepublic,aswellasextremism-drivenconflictsacrosstheSahelandnorthernMozambique,c.f.Figures3and4.44InEthiopia,followingthesigningoftheCessationofHostilitiesAgreementinNovember2022,thepeaceprocesshasbeenprogressingFigure 3: ConflictMain1.ocations,2022SSA:1.ocationswithHighestFatalities,2022IBFACODM1.INERSSDICMR.ETH.MOZ.NGASource:AC1.EDandauthors,calculationsNntARIdata70-R-723Source:AC1.EDandauthors,calculations.Notes:1.atestdata28-04-2023.3. ExclusionandConflictinThe1.iteratureTheliteratureexaminingtheimpactofexclusiononconflictisqu让eIirrdte