印度观察家研究基金会-监管国有跨国企业的全球框架（英）-2021.11-13正式版.docx

Speciak闻尼地>GlobalFrameworkforRegulatingState-OwnedMultinationalEnterprisesAkshayMathur>2021ObserverResearchFoundation.llrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,copied,archived,reUinedortransmittedthroughprint,speechorelectronicmediawithoutpriorwrittenapprovalfromORF.AbstractTheIMFestimatesthatState-OwnedEnterprise(SOE)assetstotalledUS$45trillionin2018,closeto50%oftheglobalGDP,andcalculatedthedebtofthelargestSOEstobeUS$7.4trillion.Clearly,SOEshaveadirectbearingontheglobaleconomy.ThemostsystemicallyimportantSOEsaretheState-OwnedMultinationalEnterprises(SOMNEs)sincetheyarefocusedoncross-borderfinancingandbusiness.AglobalframeworkforregulatingSOMNEsisneeded,onethatdefinesSOMNEsclearly,enforcestransparencyandownershipofbusinessaccounts,mapscross-borderfinancialinterlinkages,andrequiresregularexercisesonfinancialstability.Attribution:AkshayMathur,uGIobaIFrameworkforRegulatingState-OwnedMultinationalEnterprises,"ORFSpecialReportNo.166,November2021,ObserverResearchFoundation.ChallengeSOMNEsaredeeplyentrenchedintheinternationalfinancialandtradingsystem.Theiroperationsimpactglobalsupplychains,capitalflowsandmacroeconomicpolicy.Yet,thereisnouniversalframeworkforgoverningmultinationalSOEs.ThemismanagementofSOMNEscanbeamajorrisktotheglobaleconomyandmayspawnaglobalfinancialcrisis.The G20 can create a framework that helpsIdentify a SOMNEDocuments cross-border linkages and systemic risks for each SOMNEEnsures that SOMNE activities are monitored regularlyProposalSinceSOMNEshaveadirectbearingontheglobaleconomy,particularlyfinancialstability,itisnaturalthateffortstodesignuniversalrulesfortheirgovernanceshouldbeledbytheG20.Withoutgloballyacceptedprudentialnorms,SOMNEsmayprovetobeasystemicriskfortheinternationalfinancialsystem.DataonSOMNEsislimited,butsincetheyoperateinthesamemarketplaceasprivateenterprise,theyshouldbesubjectedtosimilarrulesontransparencyasmultinationalcorporations.AgoodstartingpointistousetheregulationsandstandardsthatexistforSOEs.AsperanIMFreport,theshareofSOEassetsamongsttheworld's2,000largestfirmsisnearly20%;atUS$45trillionin2018,theseaccountfor50%ofglobalGDP.ThesamereportestimatesthedebtofthelargestSOEstobeUS$7.4trillion.SOEsarepresentacrossthedevelopedanddevelopingeconomies.SomeofthelargestandmostvibrantSOEscanbefoundinGermany,France,Norway,Italy,China,India,Brazil,Malaysia,Indonesia,andSaudiArabia.Theyarespreadacrosssectorssuchasfinance,utilities,energy,transport,andcommunicationinbothdevelopedanddevelopingcountries.ChineseSOEsarealwaysunderthescannerforpotentialcross-bordersystemicrisksgiventhescaleoftheenterprisesandtheirinterlinkageswiththeglobaleconomy.Therearenearly150,000SOEsinChina,accountingfornearlyUS$22trillioninassets,manyofthemwithinternationalbusinessoperations.SovereignWealthFunds(SWFs)areanotherformofSOMNEswhosefinancialsustainabilitycanhaveseriousimplicationsfortheglobaleconomy.InOctober2008,theSWFsvoluntarilypublishedthelSantiagoPrinciples'toguide“transparency,governance,accountability,andprudentinvestmentpractices.Yet,concernsaboutSWFs,systemicrisksremainduetothesheersizeandscaleoftheirpresence.APIIEreportestimatedthattheassetsundermanagementof37SWFsitexaminedin2008wasnearlyUS$2.6trillion,butby2019thescalehadreached64SWFswithassetsworthUS$8.1trillion(Maire,etal2021).3SWFshavealsobeenwithdrawingtheirassetstotideoverfiscaldeficitsduetoCOVID-19andthedropinoilprices,bothofwhichmayhaveimplicationsfortheglobaleconomy.Definingastate-ownedmultinationalenterpriseAfirststepforregulatingSOMNEsistohaveagloballyaccepteddefinitionforthem.ThisisdifficultbecausethereisyetnoglobaldefinitionforSOEseither.Nevertheless,someinternationalinstitutionsandplurilateralinitiativeshaveattemptedrecentlytodefineSOEs.Forinstance,theTranspacificPartnership(TPP)definesanSOEas:Anenterprisethatisprincipallyengagedincommercialactivitiesinwhichaparty(government): directlyownsmorethan50%ofthesharecapital controls,throughownershipinterests,theexerciseofmorethan50%ofthevotingrights,or holdsthepowertoappointamajorityofmembersoftheboardofdirectorsoranyotherequivalentmanagementbodyTheIMFdefinesapubliccorporationas“entitiesthatarecontrolled-directlyorindirectlybythegovernmenwiththefollowingcriteriatomeasuregovernmentcontrol: ownershipofthemajorityofthevotinginterest controloftheboardorothergoverningbody controloftheappointmentandremovalofkeypersonnel controlofkeycommitteesoftheentity ownershipofgoldensharesandoptions capacitytochangeregulation controlbyadominantpublicsectorcustomerorgroupofpublicsectorcustomers,and controlattachedtoborrowingfromthegovernmentTheWorldBankdefinesthepublicsectorasconsistingofthefollowingtypesofinstitutions:CentralgovernmentsandtheirdepartmentsPoliticalsubdivisionssuchasstates,provinceandmunicipalitiesCentralbanksAutonomousinstitutions,suchasfinancialandnon-financialcorporations,commercialanddevelopmentbanks,railways,utilities,etc.,where:- Thebudgetoftheinstitutionissubjecttotheapprovalofthegovernmentofthereportingcountry;or- Thegovernmentownsmorethan50%ofthevotingstockormorethanhalfofthemembersoftheboardofdirectorsaregovernmentrepresentatives;or- Incaseofdefault,thestatewouldbecomeliableforthedebtoftheinstitution.AglobaldefinitionforSOMNEscanbeproducedbyusingtheTPP,IMFandWorldBankdefinitionsofpublic-sectorcompaniesasthebaseandaddingselectextraindicatorsthatrepresenttheirmultinationalnature.Forinstance,adefinitionforSOMNEscanbecreatedbyaddingthefollowingattributes: Shareofrevenueearnedfromforeignoperations(toidentifySOMNEsbytheirinternationalbusinessoperations) Shareofassetsandliabilitiesattributedtoforeignentities(toidentifySOMNEsbytheirglobalinvestorsandcross-borderacquisitions)Withsuchauniversaldefinition,itwillbecomeeasiertoidentifySOMNEsaswellastheirgeographicconcentration,sovereignaffiliation,marketintegration,andsupplychaindependencies.Disclosureofdatabystate-ownedmultinationalenterprisesTransparencyanddisclosurearenotnewpursuitsbutthequestforbetterdataandSUrVe川ancehasbecomeevenmorecriticalgiventheweakeningfiscalsituationofmanynations.Expertshavewarnedhowexternalborrowingbystate-owned(orguaranteed)enterpriseshasincreaseddrasticallybutthereportinghasnotkeptpace(Pazarbasiogluetal2021).4ExistinginitiativesondisclosurerequirementsforSOEsareusuallymotivatedbythefollowing: ForCorPoralegovernance：Theseincludeguidelinesandinitiativesthatfocusoncurbingcorruptionandimprovingcorporategovernancetoensurefirm-levelresilienceandstability.Theseguidelinestypicallyareapplicablefornational,subnationalandevenlocalSOEs. FOrSVStemiCaIIVimportantfinancialinsiiiutions：Theseincludetheguidelinesandinitiativesundertakenbypublicandprivatebanksafterthetrans-Atlanticcrisisof2008ontSystemicallyImportantFinancialInstitutions(SIFIs)1,particularlytheworkdonebytheFinancialStabilityBoard,IMF,andBankofInternationalSettlementsinupgradingstandardsfordisclosureandresiliency.Sincedisclosurenormsforpublicly-listedSOEs,particularlythoseinthefinancialservices,areclearlyestablishedandenforcedbyfinancialmarketregulators,thefocusofthisproposalisonthenon-lisled,government-supportedSOMNEs.TheWorldBankandIMFhaveestablishedregulationsfordisclosingdataondebtbutnonespecificallyforSOEs(orSOMNEs).Theguidelinesinplacetodaytreatofficial(bilateralandmultilateral)andprivateSOMNEsalike.InthewakeofthepandemicandtheworkbeingdonebytheIMFandWorldBanktoassistnationswitheconomicrecovery,thereisarenewedfocusondebtdisclosure.Therefore,thetimeisripetoestablishspecificregulationsfordisclosureofinformationforSOMNEs.ItwillhelpG20-ledinitiativessuchastheDebtServiceSuspensionInitiative(DSSI),whichisworkingondevelopinga,commonframework'betweenlendersfromParisClubandNon-ParisClubnationstoprovidedebtrelieftothemostvulnerablenations.TheG20cancraftguidelinesfor: DiSCloSUreOfCrOSS-borderODrraIionSbySe)MNES(forinstance,foreigncurrency-denominatedfinancingbySOMNEstoprivateorpublicfirmsforprojectfinancingforinfrastructure)tosovereigns,sub-sovereignsandpublicsectorentities(orborrowerswithpublicguarantees)ondisclosinginformationsuchasinterestrates,maturityanduseofproceeds.AnysuchguidelineforSOMNEswillhavetobeprecededbyguidelinesthataccuratelydistinguishsovereignlendersandborrowersfromtrulyprivatelenders.TheWorldBankInternationalDebtStatistics2021estimatesthatthetotalexternaldebtstockoflow-incomecountrieseligibleforDSSIwasUS$744billionin2019.Ofthis,lendingfromprivatecreditorstoDSSI-eligiblecountrieswasUS$102billion.>TheWorldBankDebtorReportingSystemrequirestheborrowingnationtoreportthenameofthecreditornationandcreditinginstitutionextendingtheloanforpublicandpubliclyguaranteedloancommitments.ItisamethodologydescribedintheSystemofNationalAccounts(SNA2008)andtheIMFBalanceOfPaymentsmanual(BPM6). DiSCloSUreOfCreditgivenOrtakenbySOMNES(e.g.lendersOrborrowers)TheVoluntaryPrinciplesforDebtTransparencypublishedbytheInstituteforInternationalFinanceisagoodframeworktobuildon.ItprovidesguidelinesonforeigncurrencylendingYet,SOEsseemtofindloopholes.Forinstance,theWorldBankDebtorReportingSystem(DRS)Manuakdesignatesallcommercialbanksaspubliciftheyaredebtorsbutprivateiftheyarecreditors,asaresultofwhichcreditingcommercialbanksareoutsidethescopeofdebtdatareporting.Thisneedstochange.ExpertsfromtheBruegelhavehighlightedhowthemisclassificationofbankshascontributedtotheslowuptakeofG20,sDSSI(Bery,Herrero,Weil,2021).7AreportbytheGroupofThirtyunderlinedtheimportanceofdisclosurebyhighlightinghowsomenationsareunder-reportingtheirpublicborrowingandforeigncurrencyexposurebyborrowingthroughtheirSOEs(forinstance,state-backedoilcompanies)Sofar,therisksposedbySOEshaveremainedwithinnationalboundaries.Forinstance,PIIEexpertreportedthatSOEsinChinadefaultedon80bondsworthnearlyUS$15billionduetofiscalconstraintsandthegovernment,sugradualphaseoutofgovernmentguaranteesonstatefirmliabilities"(HuangT,2021)Thereportexplainedthecross-borderimplicationsforthesedefaultswerelikelytobelimitedsinceforeigninvestorsholdlittleinChina'scorporatebondmarket.Similarly,thecaseofMozambiqueismostreadilycitedtoillustratehowdebtcanbe*hidden,despiteguidelinesondebttransparency.AspertheIMF,Mozambiquedidnotdisclosetoittwostate-backedguaranteesworthUS$1.15billion(9%ofGDPin2015)providedtoSOEsregisteredasprivateenterprises.SincetheSOEsweredesignatedasprivateenterprisesandmoneywasdirectlytransferredtocontractors,dataontheloansnevermadeittothedisclosures.oWhentheloanswereeventuallydiscovered,therevelationjoltedthefinancialmarkets,leadingtoasharpspikeinbondyields.RequiringSOMNEStouseIeisforallcross-borderfinancialtransactionsFinally,howeffectivelySOMNEscanberegulatedgloballywilldependontheenforcementmechanism.Whatiseventuallyneededisreal-time,enforcementandtoavoidanydependenceonself-reportingbySOEs.TheLegalEntityIdentifier(LEI),mandatedbytheG20andoverseenbytheGlobalLegalEntityIdentifierFoundation,canbemademandatoryforallcross-borderfinancialtransactionsundertakenbySOMNEs.WithLEItracking,BeneficialOwnershipinformationwillalsobecomepossible,whichcanhelptraceandmonitortheSOMNEs,activities.Sincethecentralbanksareusuallyresponsibleforregulatingcross-borderfinancialtransactions,theycanenforcetheuseofLEIsoncross-bordercreditrelatedtransactionsonboththelenderandtheborrower.ArelatedproposaltotheG20oncreatingaglobalframeworkforBeneficialOwnershipwrittenbypolicyexpertsisinthepublicdomain(Vaidyanathanetal).AppendixRegulatoryFrameworkDateLeadinstitutionHighlightsandexcerptstakenfromofficialdocumentsReformofthePolicyonPublicDebtLimitsinFund-SupportedProgramsNov,2020IMFBetterdebtdisclosuretotheIMF,includinginformationoncreditorcomposition,profileoftheholdersofthecountry'spublicdebt,dataondebtserviceinadditiontodebtstock,dataondebtsubjecttonon-disclosureagreements,clarityindefiningthedistributionof"commercial"andwofficia,creditorsPublicSectorDebtdefinitionsandreportinginlow-incomedevelopingcountriesJan31,2020IMFandWBGuidelinesondifferentreportingrequirementsfromIMFandWorldBankIDANon-ConcessionalBorrowingPolicySep24,2019WBPublicdebtstatisticssufferfromlimiteddebtdatacoverageanddebttransparency.ThisisespeciallythecasefordebtstoSOEs,contingentliabilitiesrelatedtoPublicPrivatePartnerships(PPPs),andcollateraliseddebt.GuidelinesonAnti-CorruptionandIntegrityinState-OwnedEnIerPriSeSMay2019OECDPreventionofcorruptionandguidelinesforaccountabilityVoluntaryPrinciplesforDebtTransparencyJun10,2019IIFProvidesguidelinesonforeigncurrencylendingtosovereigns,sub-sovereignsandpublicsectorentities(orborrowerswithpublicguarantees)ondisclosinginformationsuchasinterestrates,maturityanduseofproceedsRecommendationofthecouncilonsustainablelendingpracticesandofficiallysupportedexportcreditsJun8,2018OECDGuidelinesonprovidingofficialexportcreditstopublicobligorsorpubliclyguaranteedobligorsinlowerincomecountriesG20NotesonStrengtheningPublicDebtTransparencyJun14,2018IMFandWBGuidelinesondebtmanagementanddebtdatatransparencyRegulatoryFrameworkDateLeadinstitutionHighlightsandexcerptstakenfromofficialdocumentsG20High-LevelPrinciplesforPreventingCorruptionandEnsuringIntegrityinState-OwnedEnterprises2018G20PreventionofcorruptionandcorporategovernanceofSOEsG2()OperationalGuidelinesforSustainableFinancingMar,2017IMFGuidelinesontransparencyofcreditorsinthreeareas:1)disclosureonlending,contracts,2)fiscaltransparency,debtmanagement3)debtrestructuringConsolidatedPrinciplesonPromotingResponsibleSovereignLendingandBorrowingJan1(),2012UNCTADGuidelinesondisclosinginformationabouttermsandconditionsofthefinancingagreementbythesovereignborrower.Also,disclosureofdataonexternalanddomesticdebt,externalaccounts,derivativepositions,sovereignguarantees.PrinciplesforstablecapitalflowsandfairdebtrestructuringinemergingmarketsMar31,200511FDisclosureofoveralleconomicsituation,levelsofindebtedness,balanceofpayments,interestrateandmaturityofallexternalfinancialsovereignobligationsChapter17-State-OwnedEnterprisesandDesignatedMonopoliesCPTPPDefinesastate-ownedenterpriseandinstrumentslike,non-commercialassistance'.Rulesfornon-discriminatorytreatment,commercialconsiderations,non-commercialassistanceDefines'adverseaffects'ofnon-commercialassistanceRulesfortransparency,includingpublicdeclarationofstate-ownedenterprisesandThisreportwasfirstpublishedinSeptember2021asapolicybriefforT20ItalyunderTF9-InternationalFinance,https:/www.t20italy.org/20210827global-framework-for-regulating-state-owed-multinatioal-enterprises-somnes/10Endnotes1 IMF,State-OwnedEnterprises:TheOtherGovernment,Chapter3,Pg49,https:/www.imf.Org/media/Files/Publications/fiscal-monitor/2020/April/English/ch3.ashx2 InternationalForumofSovereignWealthFunds,SantiagoPrinciples,https:/www.ifswf.org/santiago-principles-landing/santiago-principles>text=The%20Santiago%20Principles%20consists%20of1deeper%20understanding%20of%20SWF%20activities.