国际事务研究院-尚未适应世界：欧盟军事、网络和情报资产的零碎积累（英）-2021.11-42正式版.docx

November 2021Contributing authors:Kristine Berzina, Ivo Juurvee5Tony Lawrence and Maurice TurnerJOINTAjoined-upUnion,astrongerEuropeJOINTResearchPapersNo.4NotYetFitfortheWorld:PiecemealBuildupofEUMilitary,CyberandIntelligenceAssetsKristiRaikThisprojecthasreceivedfundingfromtheEuropeanUnion'sHorizon2020researchandinnovationprogrammeundergrantagreementN.959143.Thispublicationreflectsonlytheviewoftheauthor(s)andtheEuropeanCommissionisnotresponsibleforanyusethatmaybemadeoftheinformationitcontains.NotYetFitfortheWorld:PiecemealBuildupofEUMilitary,CyberandIntelligenceAssetsLeadauthor:KristiRaikContributingauthors:KristineBerzina,IvoJuurvee,TonyLawrenceandMauriceTurner*AbstractInthepastdecades,theEUhasdevelopedanincreasinglybroad,multi-sectoralsetofforeignandsecuritypolicyinstruments.AllofthesecanberelevantinsustainingtheEU,scrisisandconflictmanagementefforts.Whiletryingtocreateamoreeffectiveandintegratedtoolbox,theUnionhasfacedanumberofchallenges.First,astheEU,sscopeofactivityandlevelofambitionhaveincreased,theneedtostrengthentheuharderend”ofinstruments-includingmilitary,cyberandintelligencetools-hasbeenwidelyacknowledged,buttheseremainweak.Second,withEUpoliciesextendingtoareaswheretheUnion,sresourcesandcompetenciesareweak,theneedtomobilisememberstates1resourceshasbecomemoreimportant,butensuringmeaningfulcontributionsfrommemberstateshasprovendifficult.Third,ithasbecomeanevermorecomplextasktoconnectthemultiplesectorstoeachothertobuildacomprehensivepolicy.KristiRaikisDirectoroftheEstonianForeignPolicyInstituteattheInternationalCentreforDefenceandSecurity(ICDS).KristineBerzinaisSeniorFellowandHeadoftheGeopoliticsTeamattheAllianceforSecuringDemocracyintheGermanMarshallFundoftheUnitedStates(GMF).IvoJuurveeisHeadofSecurity&ResilienceProgrammeattheICDS.TonyLawrenceisHeadofDefencePolicyandStrategyProgrammeattheICDS.MauriceTurnerisCybersecurityFellowattheAllianceforSecuringDemocracyintheGMF.TheauthorsaregratefultoStevenBlockmans,ZachPaikinandDylanMacchiariniCrossonfromCEPSandPolBargudsfromCIDOBfortheirthoroughandinsightfulcommentsonearlierversionsofthepaper.IntroductionThefirstforeignpolicytoolsoftheEuropeanUniondatebacktothecreationoftheEuropeanEconomicCommunityin1957,whichestablishedcommonexternaleconomicpolicieswithastrongsupranationalcompetence.Thiswastraditionallyseenasthetechnical,hIowpoliticsnareaofexternalrelations,asopposedtothe“highpolitics*'ofsensitiveforeignandsecuritypolicymatterswherememberstateswerekeentomaintainanintergovernmentalapproach.1Foreignpolicycoordinationamongmemberstatesincreasedfromthe1970s,butaleaptoamoreinstitutionalised-yetstillintergovernmental-CommonForeignandSecurityPolicy(CFSP)wasonlymadewiththeMaastrichtTreatysignedin1992.ThenewmomentumwasinitiatedbydramaticchangesintheinternationalenvironmentthatcreatedbothnewspaceandaneedforastrongerEuropeanapproachtoregionalsecuritymatters,whichwasmostpainfullyunderscoredbythewarsinformerYugoslavia.Sincethe1990s,theUnionhasbeengraduallystrengtheningthe“higher Stanley Hoffmann, ,The European Process at Atlantic Crosspurposes,l in Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1964), p. 85-101. Josep Borrell Fontelles, Opening statement, Hearing at the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the European Parliament, Brussels, 7 October 2019, https:/multimedia.europarl.europa.eu/en/ hearing-of-josep-borrell- fontelles-high-representative-vice-president-designate-of-the-european-commission-opening-statement_l 178140-V_v.'and*,hardernendofEUforeignandsecuritypolicyinstruments,therebybecominganincreasinglymultisectoralforeignpolicyactor.Duringthepastdecade,thechanginginternationalenvironmenthasyetagaincreatednewdemands,astheworldhasbecomemoremultipolar,uncertaintyabouttheUnitedStates*commitmenttoEuropeansecurityhasgrown,instabilityintheEU,simmediateneighbourhoodhasincreased,andsecurityrisksandthreatshavebecomemorecomplexandmanifold.InthewordsofHighRepresentativeoftheEUforForeignAffairsandSecurityPolicyJosepBorrell,thishascreatedtheneedfortheEUto,learntousethelanguageofPoWer"2-whichimpliesthenecessitytodevelopitsforeignpolicytoolsaccordingly.TheEUhasmadeeffortstostrengthenitsmilitarycapabilitiesintheframeworkoftheCommonSecurityandDefencePolicy(CSDP)launchedin1999,whileadditionaltoolshavebeencreatedtoaddressnewthreatsinareassuchascybersecurityanddisinformation.TheEUhasthusconstructedanincreasinglycomplextoolboxcomposedofnumerouscompartmentsgovernedbydifferentinstitutionalarrangementsanddecision-makingprocedures,wherebytheEUforeignandsecuritypolicy(EUFSP)hasexpandedbeyondtherelativelylimiteddiplomatic-militaryremitoftheCFSP/CSDP.Howtomobilisethedifferentinstrumentsandapplytheminaconcertedmannerhasbecomeanincreasinglypressingandcomplicatedquestiontoanswer.ThisreportaimstounpackthiscomplexitybyexploringhowandwhyEUFSPhasbecomemoremulti-sectoraloverthepastdecades.ItfocusesonpolicytoolsthatsustainEUcrisisandconflictmanagementefforts.Followingtheintroduction,thesecondpartofthereportanalysestheinternalandexternalfactorsthathaveshapedthedevelopmentofamoremulti-sectoralEUFSPandthenprovidesanoverviewandassessmentoftwokeyareas:diplomacyandcrisismanagement.Thethirdpartwilltakeacloserlookataselectionofmorerecentanddynamicinstrumentsinthreefields:military,cybersecurityandintelligencecapabilities,whichareallvitalfortheEU,sabilitytomanagecontemporaryconflictsandcrises.Finally,thereportdrawsconclusionsonthesuccessesandfailuresofamulti-sectoralapproach,highlightingthreechallengesidentifiedwhileanalysingtheevolutionoftheinstruments.First,astheEU,sscopeofactivityandlevelofambitionhaveincreased,theneedtostrengthenthe,harderend"ofinstrumentshasbeenwidelyacknowledged,buttheseremainweakcomparedtotheEU,ssoft,civilian/non-coercivetools.Second,duetogrowing“multi-sectorness"extendingtoareaswheretheEU,sresourcesandcompetenciesareweak,theneedtomobilisememberstates'resourcesandcooperateandcoordinatewithotheractorshasbecomemoreimportantbutensuringmeaningfulcontributionsfrommemberstatesinparticularhasprovendifficult.Third,ithasbecomeanevermorecomplextasktoconnectthemultiplesectorstoeachothertobuildacomprehensivepolicy.1. Conceptualisation,overviewandassessmentoftheincreasinglymulti-sectoralEUFSP1.1 Internalandexternalpressuretowardsgrowingmulti-sectornessThegrowingmulti-sectornessofEUFSPduringthepastdecadescanbeexplainedbyaninterplayofinternalandexternalfactors.Internally,deepeningintegrationhasbroughtnewpolicyareastotheEU,sagendaandgraduallyextendedEllcompetenciesinareastraditionallybelongingtotherealmofnationalsovereignty.Sincethe1950s,thisprocesshasattimesaccelerated,andattimesstoodstill,butoverall,onecanarguethattherehasbeenafunctionalistlogicofintegrationextendingfromonesectortoanother,withspill-overeffectstriggeringfurthercooperation.Forexample,economicandtradeintegrationhadimplicationsformemberstates1relationswiththirdcountries,contributingtoclosercoordinationoftheirforeignandsecuritypolicies.IthasalsobeenarguedthatforeignpolicyintegrationhasfollowedthelogicofinternalfunctionalityinthesenseofbeingavehicleforfurtherevolutionoftheEuropeanprojectsWhiletheinternallogicoffunctionalityhaspushedintegrationforward,theprinciplesofintergovernmentalismandnationalsovereigntyhaveremainedstrongintherealmofforeignandsecuritypolicy,whichisvisibleinthedevelopmentofEUFSPinstruments.EveninthemostintegratedaspectoftheEU,sexternalrelations,trade,thegrowingcomplexityandstrongerpoliticalaspectsoftradeagreementshavemadeitmoredifficulttogaintheapprovalofallmemberstatesfornewdeals.Inthefieldofdiplomacy,foreignpolicyintegrationhasnotreducedmemberstates*investmentintheirowndiplomatictools(e.g.diplomaticstaffandnetworksofembassies)whichinthecaseoflargermemberstatesisfarlargerthantheEuropeanExternalActionService(EEAS)thatcomprisesthediplomaticarmoftheEUmEUforeignpolicycanbeseentoentailboththepoliciesinstitutionalisedattheEUlevelandnationalforeignpolicies,althoughinpracticememberstates*actionsarenotalwaysalignedwithwhathasbeencommonlyagreedattheEUlevel.NationalinstrumentscanbeappliedtothebenefitoftheEUasawhole,forexample,withmemberstatesallocatingpartoftheirdevelopmentcooperationfundsthroughtheEU.Furthermore,onsomeoccasions,nationalforeignministershaveconductednegotiationswiththirdcountriesonbehalfoftheUnion.However,thereisavastunusedpotentialinactuallymakingmemberstates*foreignpolicyinstrumentsavailabletotheEUandusingthemtoimplementjointlyagreedEUpolicies.ChristopherJ.Bickerton,EuropeanUnionForeignPolicy:FromEffectivenesstoFunctionality,Basingstoke,PalgraveMacmillan,2011.4 RosaBalfour,CaterinaCartaandKristiRaik,“Conclusions:AdaptationtotheEUortotheChangingGlobalContext?'*,inRosaBalfour,CaterinaCartaandKristiRaik(eds),TheEuropeanExternalActionServiceandNationalForeignMinistries.ConvergenceorDivergence?,Farnham,Ashgate52015,p.197.ThetensionbetweensupranationalandintergovernmentalelementsofEUFSP,andpossiblewaystomovebeyondthedichotomy,hasbeenextensivelycoveredinearlierstudies.5However,thedichotomyremainsvisibleinthedifferentinstitutionalstructuresandpolicy-makingproceduresindifferentareasofEUFSP.Theinstitutionalandproceduralcomplexityisanimportantfeatureofthemulti-sectornessofEUFSPthatreducesitsconsistencyandeffectiveness.NewmeasurestoimproveconsistencyandcoordinationhavebeenintroducedwithtreatychangessinceMaastricht,especiallywiththeLisbonTreatythatcreatedtheEuropeanExternalActionServicesYetcoordinationamonginstitutions,notablytheEEASandtheCommission,andbetweentheEUandnationalinstitutionsremainedamajorchallenge.7Externally,thechanginginternationalenvironmenthascreatednewdemandsandopportunitiesforastrongerEUforeignandsecuritypolicy.Inthe1970s,Europeanforeignpolicycoordinationwasenhancedintheshadowofbipolarcompetitionbetweenthetwosuperpowersofthetime,theUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnion.Quiteliketoday,Europeans-especiallytheFrench-weremotivatedtopursueamoreindependentforeignpolicythatwasnotalwaysinagreementwiththeUnitedStates(withvisibletensionsinthetransatlanticrelationshipoverissuessuchastheMiddleEast,AfghanistanandPoland).8ThecollapseoftheEasternblocandtheendoftheColdWarcreatedanentirelynewexternalenvironmentwheretheEUandtheUnitedStatesagreedonthestrategicgoalstoreunifyEuropeandextendliberaldemocracyandmarketeconomytotheformerEasternbloc,whiletheEUhadanindispensableroletoplay5 E.g.,ibid.;JosepBatora,*The1MitraiIIeuseEffect':TheEEASasanInterstitialOrganizationandtheDynamicsofInnovationinDiplomacy,inJournalofCommonMarketStudies,Vol.51,No.4(July2013),p.598-613;JolyonHoworth1,Decision-MakinginSecurityandDefensePolicy:TowardsSupranationalInter-Governmentalism?",inCooperationandConflict,Vol.47,No.4(December2012),p.433-453.6 Jean-ClaudePiris,TheLisbonTreaty:ALegalandPoliticalAnalysis,Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,2010.7 ChristopheHillionandStevenBlockmans,FromSelf-DoubttoSelf-Assurance.TheEuropeanExternalActionServiceastheIndispensableSupportforaGeopoliticalEU,Brussels,CEPSSIEPSFES,January2021,https:/www.sieps.se/en/publications/2021/from-self-doubt-to-self-assurance.OHazelSmith,EuropeanUnionForeignPolicy.WhatItIsandWhatItDoes,LondonZSterIing,PlutoPress,2002,p.127-135.inpursuingthesegoals.Atthesametime,thewarsinformerYugoslaviaandthefragilesecuritysituationinmanyotherpartsoftheformerEasternbloccalledforastrongerEUcontributiontoEuropeansecuritybeyondtheUnion,sborders.ThisnewcontextcontributedtotheestablishmentoftheCFSPandtheemergenceofenlargementasamajor,aswellasdistinctlymulti-sectoral,foreignpolicytoolfocusedonsecuringdemocracy,stabilityandeconomicdevelopmentinEurope.Thenewpost-ColdWarenvironmentalsoexplainstheriseofcrisismanagementasamajorpriorityofCSDP5withthefirstmissionslocatedintheWesternBalkans.Furthermore,thespecificshapeofEUcrisismanagement,withafocusonciviliantoolsandlong-terminvolvementinpost-conflictreconstruction,reflectsboththeinternalnatureoftheEUandthebroaderinternationaltrendsatthetime.TheEU,sinternalhistoricalexperienceofsecuringpeacethroughintegrationhasbeenreflectedintheemphasisputontheinstitution-buildingandintegrationoftheWesternBalkancountriesintotheUnion.Externally,theendofColdWarconfrontationsreducedtherelevanceofmilitarypower,inspiteoftheYugoslavwarshappeningrightnextdoorandunderscoringtheEU,sinabilitytopreventthefightingortointervene.AlthoughwarwasstillarealityinonecornerofEurope,inalonger-termperspectivethefutureofEuropeansecuritydependedtoalargeextentonthesuccessofpoliticalandeconomictransformationinpost-Communistcountriesandbeyond,whichhighlightedtheneedforabroadersetoftools.Internally,theEUbuiltitsforeignpolicyidentitystronglyonthenotionsofcivilianandnormativepower(thelatternotexcludingtheuseofmilitaryinstruments,butnonethelessstressinganon-militaryapproach).Inanattempttoturnthelackofmilitarycapabilitiesintoavirtue-orreflectingaconvictionthatacivilianapproachwasindeedtheEU,sparticularstrengthandadvantage-theEU(andahostofEUFSPresearch)emphasisedtheuniquenatureofitsinternationalactorness.9Sincethemid-2000s,theEuropeanandinternationalsecurityenvironmenthasbecomemoreconflictual,complexandunpredictable.ThisisevidentinthecontrastbetweentheEuropeanSecurityStrategyof2003andtheEUGlobalStrategyof9 E.g.,FranoisDuchene,*4TheEuropeanCommunityandtheUncertaintiesoflnterdependence,',inMaxKohnstammandWolfgangHager(eds),ANationWritLarge?Foreign-PolicyProblemsbeforetheEuropeanCommunity,LondonZBasingstoke,PalgraveMaCm川an,1973,p.1-21;IanManners,NormativePowerEurope:AContradictioninTerms?",inJournalofCommonMarketStudies,Vol.40,No.2(June2002),p.235-258.2016.WhiletheprioritiesofEUFSPremainedlargelythesame,thelatterpointstoahostofnewchallenges,highlightingtheneedtowenhanceoureffortsondefence,cyber,counterterrorism,energyandstrategicCornrnUniCationS'ZoThestrategyalsocallsforstrongerintelligencecapabilitiestoachieve"betterandsharedassessmentsofinternalandexternalthreatsandchallenges,.nTheseinstrumentsarepartofan“integratedapproachtoconflictsandcrises-aconceptintroducedbytheGlobalStrategy,buildingonearliereffortstodevelopa“comprehensiveapproach".TheneedtostrengthentheharderendofEUFSPinstrumentshasbeendictatedbyexternalfactors,whiletheEU,sreadinesstomoveaheadhasbeenweakenedbyinternalpoliticalfactorssuchaslackofacommonstrategiccultureandsharedthreatperceptions.Arguablytoday,whiletheregionalandglobalsecurityenvironmentmakesstrengtheningEUFSPmorenecessarythanever,strongerinternalcohesionismoredifficulttoachieve.1 .2AssessingtheevolutionofEUdiplomacyandcrisismanagementAsnotedabove,theEU,sdiplomatictoolsmadealeapforwardwiththeMaastrichtTreatythatestablishedtheCFSP.ThecreationoftheinstitutionsoftheHighRepresentative(HR)forCFSP(1999),apostlatermergedwiththatoftheExternalActionCommissionerintoanempoweredHighRepresentativeoftheUnionforForeignAffairsandSecurityPolicyandVice-PresidentoftheCommission(HRVP)(2009),andtheEEAS(alsoin2009)strengthenedtheEU,sdiplomaticcapacity.YettheUnion,sachievementsinmanagingconflictsandcriseshavebeenmodest.Weakpoliticalunity,institutionalcohesionandpolicyinstruments,includinghardpowertobackupsofttools,arefrequentlycitedreasonsforthelimitedsuccess.Abrieflookatfourdifferentcases-thewarsinex-Yugo