国际事务研究院-非盟-欧盟和平与安全关系（英）-2021.11-19正式版.docx

POLICYBRIEFOctober2021FEPSFOUNDATIONFOREUROPEANPROGRESSIVESTUDiESAUTHORBERNARDO VENTURIDirector and Co-Founder of the Agency for Peacebuilding (AP), IAI Research AssociateAU-EURELATIONSONPEACEANDSECURITYABSTRACTPeaceandsecurity(P&S)isakeyComPonenWaeferelationsbetweentheAfricanUnionandthe甲Union,andislikelytocontinuetoplayacentrathefuture.Yet,somesignificantchangesaretheroleplayedbytheAfricanUnionduetothetheEuropeanPeaceFund.Againstthisbackdrc三paperaimstoanalysethe,stateoftheart”ofAU-WrelationsonpeaceandsecurityandtoconsideritsQ.trajectories.Inthisframework,itanalysessomekeylessonslearnedfromAU-EUcooperationonpeaceansecurityfromthelastseventeenyears.Itthenconsidersthemainstructuralasymmetriesanddriversbetweenthetwocontinents.Theassumptionisthatasymmetriescontinuetoplayanindirectbutrelevantrole,eveniftheyarerarelyaddressedsystematicallyoronlyspecifically.Furthermore,thepaperanalysestheEuropeanPeaceFacilityandthecurrenttrajectoryinAU-EUrelationsonP&S.Finally,asetofpolicyrecommendationsareprovidedtotheAUandEU.FocdationwJeanJaures3aIstitutoAffariInternazionaliTABLEOFCONTENTS1.Stateoftheart:TrendsandpracticesinAU-EUpeaceandsecurityrelations32. Lessonslearned43. Themainstructuralasymmetries94. Thewayforward:theEuropeanPeaceFacilityandothertrends105. Conclusionsandrecommendations14References16Abouttheauthor18FEPSFOUNDATIONFOREUROPEANPROGRESSIVESTUDIESTHEFOUNDATIONFOREUROPEANPROGRESSIVESTUDIES(FEPS)EuropeanPoliticalFoundation-Nq4BE896.230.213AvenuedesArts461000Brussels(Belgium)www.feps-europe.euFEPS_EuropeFOneaICrJeanJauresFondationjeanjaures12CiteMalesherbes,75009Paris+33(0)140232400www.iean-iaures.ora/jJauresIlalIstitutoAffariInternazionaliINPARTNERSHIPWITHsuoaffariInternazionaliViadeiMontecatini,17,00186Roma+39066976831www.iai.it/enIAIonline1. Stateoftheart:TrendsandpracticesinAU-EUpeaceandsecurityrelationsPeaceandsecurity(P&S)isakeycomponentoftherelationsbetweentheAfricanUnion(AU)andtheEuropeanUnion(EU).TheEUistheAU,ssecondmostimportantfinancialpartneronpeaceandsecurityaftertheUnitedNations(UN).Comparedwithothertopics,suchasmigrationoreventrade,overallobjectivesonpeaceandsecuritylargelyconvergeonjointinterestsandpriorities.iAddisAbabaandBrusselscanbothbenefitfromacommonapproachtoaddressarmedconflictsandviolentextremism.Yet,themodusoperand!,mutualperceptionsandtheEU,snewfinancialarchitecturecouldincreasedivergenciesinthecomingyears.Inthepast,relationsbetweenthetwocontinentsweremainlybasedontheeconomicanddevelopmentdimension,butissuesofpeaceandsecurityhaveprogressivelygrowninimportancesincetheearly-mid-1990s.2P&SgainedrelevanceintheframeworkoftheJointAfrica-EUStrategy(JAES)adoptedattheLisbonSummitinDecember2007.TheJAESwasdesignedtoaddressissuesofcommonconcernj3andto"jointlypromoteandsustainasystemofeffectivemultilateralism”一mentioning,inparticular,uthereformoftheUnitedNations(UN)systemandofotherkeyinternationalinstitutions”.41VolkerHauckandLidetTadesseShiferaw,uContinuityandChangeinEuropeanUnion-AfricaRelationsonPeaceandSecurity,ACCORDAnalysis,March24,2021,httos:/WWW.accord.ora.za/?p=32199.2FernandaFaria,uCrisisManagementinSub-SaharanAfrica.TheRoleoftheEuropeanUnion,"EUISSOccasionalPapers,no.51(2004),https:WWW.iss.europa.eu/node/68.3Includingwpeace,security,democraticgovernanceandhumanrights,fundamentalfreedoms,genderequality,sustainableeconomicdevelopment,includingindustrialisation,andregionalandcontinentalintegrationinAfrica",asdetailedin:EU-AfricaSummit,TheAfrica-EUStrategicPartnership.AJointAfrica-EUStrategy,2ndEU-FromtheEU,sperspective,since2016andtheintroductionoftheEUGlobalStrategy(EUGS),5Brusselshastriedtointegrateitsexternalprojectionthroughtwoapproaches-firstly,byenhancingtheintegratedapproach,includingmorespheresofinterventionandimprovingfieldcoordinationandpolicyconsistency;secondly,byapplyingthe,principled-pragmatismnapproachwherebyEuropeaninterestsandvaluescoexistwithoneanother.TheEUGSstatesthattheunion,willinvestinAfricanpeaceanddevelopmentasaninvestmentinitsownsecurityandprosperity"FromtheAU,sperspective,thepartnershiponpeaceandsecuritywithBrusselsisparamount.However,thereisaperceptionthatEU,sapproachesareincreasinglymoreinfluencedbydomesticneedsandperceivedthreatsrelatedtoextremismandirregularmigration.?Furthermore,manyAfricanleadersandinstitutionswanttodiversifytheirpartners-fromChinatoRussiaorTurkey-eventhoughthosepartnersstillhavelimitedengagementonP&S.WhilethenextAU-EUSummitwillnotnowbehelduntilFebruary2022,somesignalscanbededucedfromthecommunicationuTowardsaAfricaSummit,Lisbon,December8-912007,point8(ii),http:/WWW.africa-eu-partnershiD.orsitesdefaultfilesdocumentseas2007jointStrateqVen.pdf.4Ibid.,point8(iii).5EuropeanExternalActionService(EEAS)1SharedVision,CommonAction:AStrongerEurope.AGlobalStrategyfortheEuropeanUnion'sForeignandSecurityPolicy,June2016,https:/europa.eu/!Tr66Qx.6Ibid,p.36.7AlfonsoMedinillaandChloeTeevan5'BeyondGoodIntentions:TheNewEU-AfricaPartnership,"ECDPMDiscussionPapers,no.267(March2020),https:ecdpm.Ora/?p=38799.comprehensiveStrategywithAfricanreleasedbytheEuropeanCommissionandtheEuropeanExternalActionService(EEAS)inMarch2020.Sectionfourofthedocumentisdedicatedtopeace,security,governanceandresilience.TheEUindicatesthatpriorityshouldbegiventostrategiccooperationonthemaincrisisareaswhilemaintaininganintegratedapproachtotheentirecycleofconflicts(Actionno.6).Cooperationshouldalsofocusonimprovinggovernance(Action7)asapreconditionforsecurityanddevelopment,andonactionstoincreasetheresilienceofAfricancountries(Action8).Beyondtwogeneralpoliticalmessagesoncoordination("EUinstrumentsandAfricancapacitiesshouldbefurtheraligned")andfinances(wdespiteprogressontheAUPeaceFund,thefinancingofAfrican-ledpeacesupportinitiatives,includingthroughUN-assessedcontributions,remainstobeaddressed"),9theimpressionisthatthisdocument-overall,ratherfocusedonEuropeanneedsandwithlittleattentionpaidtoreciprocity-W川notreceivemuchattentioninthefuture.ThismeansthatthenextAU-EUSummitwillgrounditsworkon2. LessonsLearnedSince2004,theEUhasprovidedfundingtotheAU,toAfricanRegionalEconomicCommunities(RECs)andtoothercoalitionsthroughtheAfricanPeaceFacility(APF).TheAPFrepresentsoneoftheP川arsunderpinningtheAU-EUrelationship;itsgoalisthreefold:enhanceddialogue,operationalisingtheAfricanPeaceandSecurityArchitecture(APSA)andunderpinningpeacesupportoperationsinAfrica.TheAPSAwasestablishedbytheAUasastructuralandeEuropeanCommissionandEEAS,TowardsaComprehensiveStrategywithAfrica(JOIN/2020/4),March9,2020,https:eur2ex.europa.eu/Iegai-COntDntZenTXT?Uri=CeIeX:52020JeOOo4.otherdocumentsandissues,aspresentedinthelastsectionofthispaper.However,officersoftheEEAShavedefineditas“comprehensive”andwstillthebaseofourthinking,.oAtthesametime,theyumissaclearandsimilarresponsefromtheAfricancounterpartinordertodefinenewjointprioritiesforthefuture,.nAgainstthisbackdrop,thispaperaimstoanalysethestateoftheartofAU-EUrelationsonP&Sandtoconsideritsmaintrajectories.Inthisframework,thefollowingsectionW川analysesomekeylessonslearnedfromAU-EUcooperationonP&Sfromthelastseventeenyears.Asubsequentsectionisdedicatedtothemainstructuralasymmetriesanddriversbetweenthetwocontinents.Theassumptionisthatasymmetriescontinuetoplayanindirectbutrelevantrole,eveniftheyarerarelyaddressedsystematicallyoronlyspecifically.ThepaperthenanalysestheEuropeanPeaceFacilityandthetrajectoryinAU-EUrelationsonP&S.Finally,asetofpolicyrecommendationsisprovidedtotheAUandEU.long-termresponsetoAfricanP&Schallenges,anditsoperationalisationhasalwaysbeenoneofthepriorityactionsfortheAfrica-EUpeaceandsecuritypartnership,asdiscussedbelow.Againstthisbackdrop,whatarethelessonslearnedfromAU-EUcooperationwithinthisframework?Overall,P&Shasbeenakeypriorityareaforcooperationbetweenthetwocontinents.9Ibid,p.11.ioIAIinterview,EEAS(1),September2021.HIbid.Between2004and2019,theEUprovidedapproximately2.9billioninfinancialassistancetotheAPSA-channelledthroughtheAPF.TheAPF,financedfromtheextra-budgetaryEuropeanDevelopmentFund(EDF),12hascontributedsignificantlytoenhancingdialogueandcooperationbetweentheEUandtheAU.ThefacilitywasaimedatbackingAfricaninstitutionstoprogressinproviding"AfricansolutionstoAfricanproblems*bysupportingtheAU,theRECsandRegionalMechanisms(RMs)incarryingoutP&Soperations.Forinstance,thisfundenablestheAUtocarryoutPeaceSupportOperations(PSOs)decidedonbythePeaceandSecurityCounciltogetherwithinterventionsauthorisedbytheAU,sAssembly.Figure1-AfricaPeaceandSecurityArchitecture(APSA).12 TheEDFisthemaininstrumentforprovidingaidfordevelopmentcooperationtotheAfrican,CaribbeanandPacificstatesandtooverseascountriesandterritories.EDFprogrammesarenotfundedbytheEUbudgetbutwereinitiallyestablishedbyanInternalAgreementoftheRepresentativesoftheMemberStates.From2021,EDFprogrammesareincludedintheEU,sMultiannualFinancialFramework(MFF)andthusaresubjecttoEUfinancialregulationsinthesamewayasotherEUfundingprogrammes.TheAPFhasalsobeenacontestedfinancialtoolduetoitsrootsinEuropeandevelopmentcooperation,theultimategoalofwhichistoreduceextremepoverty.TheEUhassupportedAfricanstatesandregionalorganisationsformanyyearsthrougharangeofcivilianP&Sactivities,withtheobjectiveofstrengtheningthelinkagesbetweensecurityanddevelopment.nInfact,EU-Africasecurityrelationshavebeendominatedbythe,security-developmentnexusmantra.14AllthecurrentmainEUdocumentsonmigrationalsorefertodevelopment-andsecurity-relatedissues.15Inthe2014-17Roadmap,forinstance,peaceandsecuritycomprisethefirstpriorityoutofthefivelisted,while"humandevelopment"and"sustainableandinclusivedevelopmenttogetherwithgrowthandcontinentalintegration"occupytwootherslots.16Thesecurity-developmentnexusisconsolidatedbutatthesametimecontroversial-especiallyfornon-governmentaldevelopmentactors.Forsomestakeholders,purelysecurity-relatedactionsbelongtothesphereoftheCommonForeignandSecurityPolicy(CFSP).Otherdecision-makersareinfavourofastrongcomponentofsecurityindevelopingcountries,embeddedindevelopment.Thedifferencebetweenusecurity-relevatnand,*securitytarget11isparamountinthisregard.Security-relevantdevelopmentactivitiesareusuallyimplementedinaconflict-affectedarea,wheresecurityarrangementsandaconflict-sensitiveapproacharenecessary(workinginconflict).SecuritytargetreferstoscenariosinwhichP&Sisthedirecttargetoftheactivity(workingonconflict).Clearly,manydevelopmentmeasuresaresecurity-relevant,fromeducationtogovernance,butthisdoesnotmeanthattheworkisdirectlyintendedtoinfluencesecuritydynamics.Whileallpartiesagreeontheneedtoconnectthetwoareas,acleardistinctionbetweentheirrespectivemandatesandfinancialinstrumentsisparamount.AnotherlessoncouldbelearnedfromtheweightofthethreecomponentsoftheAPF:AfricanPeaceSupportOperations(PSOs)jtheoperationalisationoftheAPSAandinitiativesundertheEarlyResponseMechanism(ERM).17ThebulkofAPFfunding(approximately93percent)isallocatedtoPSOs,around6percentisspentoncapacitybuildingandapproximately1percentgoestotheConflictEarlyResponseMechanism.Theselattertwocomponentsare,therefore,ratherweakanddeservemoreresourcesinthefuture.w13 HauckandTadesseShiferaw1ContinuityandChangeinEuropeanUnion-AfricaRelations.'UUeliStaegerandTshepoT.Gwatiwa,uPeaceandSecurityintheContextofEU-AfricaRelations/,inTheRoutledgeHandbookofEU-AfricaRelations,ed.ToniHaastrup,LulsMahandNiallDuggan(London/NewYork:Routledge,2021),175-187.15Forinstance,seethedocumentsoftheEuropeanCommission:AEuropeanAgendaonMigration(COM2015/240),May13,2015,https:eur-lex.ewa.eulecal-conteneenT攵T?Ilri=CeIeX:52015DCo240：TheGlobalApproachtoMigratioadMobility(COM2011/743),November18,2011,https:eur-lex.eurooa.eu/Iegal-ContentenTXT?Uri=CeIeX:52011DCO743.The2014-17Roadmapisthemainoutcomeofthe2014fourthEU-AfricaSummit.SeeAfricanUnionandEuropeanUnion,Roadmap2014-2017,4thEU-AfricaSummit,Brussels,April3-4,2014,point6,httdwww.africa-eu-Dartnershio.orWen/node/7911.17TheERMisaquick-reactionfundingmechanismprovidingtheAU,RECsandRMswithimmediatelyavailablefundstopreventandmanageviolentconflict.TheEUiscommittedtoapproveorrejectrequestsforERMsupportreceivedfromAfricanpartnerswithinjust10workingdays.18MoreinformationisavailableonthewebsiteoftheAfrica-EUPartnership:https:africa-eu-partnership.org/en/financial-SUoPOrt-DartnerShiD-PrOqramme/african-DeaCe-facility.PeaceSupportOperationsCapacity-Building2681.2EarlyResponseMechanismFigure2-APFcontractedamountspertypeofactivity,2004-2019(inm川ioneuro).Source:EuropeanCommission,AfricanPeaceFacility.AnnualReport2019(Luxembourg:PublicationsOfficeoftheEuropeanUnion,2020),10,httpsrop.europa.euss5Vc.TheEUalsoconductsnineCommonSecurityandDefencePolicy(CSDP)missionsinAfrica(outofatotalofeighteen)-threeofthemintheSahelandthreeinSomalia.19TheCOVID-19crisishasreducedpersonnelonthegroundandthenumberofactions,butthemissionshavecontinuedtobeoperational.Furthermore,inJuly2021theEuropeanCounciladopted19Thecurrentmissionsare:EUBorderAssistanceMission(EUBAM)inLibya;EUCAPSomalia,assistingthatcountryindevelopingself-sustainingcapacityfortheenhancementofmaritimesecurity;EUCAPSahelMaliandEUCAPSahelNiger,supportingtheinternalsecurityforcesinthosecountries;EUNAVFORAtalanta,counteringpiracyoffthecoastofSomalia;EUTMMali,atrainingmissionfortheMalianarmedforces;EUTMRCAintheCentralAfricanRepublic,tocontributetothecountry'sdefence-sectoradecisiontosetupanEUmilitary-trainingmissioninMozambique(EUTMMozambique)s20alsowithstronginputfromthePortugueseEUPresidency.ManylessonscouldbelearnedfromCSDPdeploymentinAfrica.Akeyissuethatcouldbeparamountforfuturecooperationbetweenthetwocontinentsistoestablishstrongerconnectionsbetweenthetechnicalreform;andEUTMSomalia,amilitarytrainingmissioninSomalia;andEUTMMozambique.20TheaimofthemissionistotrainandsupporttheMozambicanarmedforcesinprotectingthecivilianpopulationandrestoringsafetyandsecurityinCaboDelgadoProvince.CounciloftheEU,"Mozambique:EUSetsUpaMilitaryTrainingMissiontoHelpAddresstheCrisisinCaboDelgado,PressReleases,July12,2021,https:europa.eu!VJ4fuw.workofthemissionandthebroaderpoliticalvision.Governance,forinstance,ismentionedrelativelyofteninCSDPpolicydocumentsbutreceiveslimitedconsiderationinallitscomponents.Thisrecognitionoftheimportanceofgovernancereformtopeaceandstabilisationisstillinitsearlystages.Forexample,EUCAPSahelMalihassupportedthegovernment,ssecurity-sectorreform(SSR)-despitethefactthatMalihasyettoundertakecomprehensiveSSR21-byofferingtrainingtothecountry,sjudicialpoliceandinintelligencegatheringandcounterterrorism.22Anotherdimensionthatdeservestobementionedhereisthefactthatpolicydialogueonsecurityandotherissueshasbeenjeopardisedbyinsufficientcommunicationandcoordinationatalllevels-technical,seniorofficialandpolitical.Asaconsequence,itsimpactisstillverylimited.23Forinstance,thisisthecasefortheannualjointmeetingsbetweentheEU,sPol