全球发展中心-国际货币基金组织的韧性和可持续性信托：条件如何帮助各国建立韧性（英）-2024.3.docx

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1、CGDCMTFPFOBG1.OBA1.DEVE1.OPMENTTheIMrSResilienceandSustainabilityTrust:HowConditionalityCanHelpCountriesBuildResilienceJOHNHICK1.INAbstractTheIMFsResilienceandSustainabilityTrust(RST)hasbeenoperationalforoverayear,withthefirstseventeencountriesreceivingcommitmentsOffinancialsupport.Butiflendingfromt

2、heRSTistoachieveitsobjectives,theIMFshouldmakeitfitterforpurposebytakingaradicallydifferentapproachinapplyingconditionstotheloans.Thispaperfirstgivesthebackgroundandsummarizestheargument;setsouttheuniquechallengesinvolvedindesigningbestpracticeconditionalitytodealwithclimatechange-thefocusoftheRSTso

3、far;andmakesthreespecificsuggestionstoaddressshortcomingsintheemergingconditionalitytomakethemostoftheIMFsnewinitiativetohelpmembercountriesbuildresilienceandsustainability.TheIMFhasadapteditsapproachbasedoninitialexperience.AforthcomingExecutiveBoardreviewwillallowforfurthercoursecorrectionandmuch-

4、neededgreatertractionfortheRST.PO1.ICYPAPER324MARCH2024TheIMF,sResilienceandSustainabilityTrust:HowConditionalityCanHelpCountriesBuildResilienceJohnHicklinCenterforGlobalDevelopmentTheauthorisgratefulforhelpfulconversationswithDavidAndrews,SanjeevGupta,KathrynMCPhai1.MarkPlant,andEtienneRomsom,andfo

5、rcommentsfromtwoanonymousreviewers;andisresponsibleforanyremainingerrors.JohnHicklin.2024.wThelMF,sResilienceandSustainabilityTrust:HowConditionalityCanHelpCountriesBuildResilience.*CGDPolicyPaper324.Washington,DC:CenterforGlobalDevelopmenthttps：/www.cgdev.orgpublication/imfs-rst-how-conditionality-

6、can-help-countries-build-resilienceCENTERFORG1.OBA1.DEVE1.OPMENTTheCenterforGlobalDevelopmentworkstoreduceglobal20551.Street,NWFifthFloorWashington,DC200361AbbeyGardensGreatCollegeStreet1.ondonSW1P3SEpovertyandimprovelivesthroughinnovativeeconomicresearchthatdrivesbetterpolicyandpracticebytheworldst

7、opdecisionmakers.UseanddisseminationofthisPolicyPaperisencouraged;however,reproducedcopiesmaynotbeusedforcommercialpurposes.FurtherusageispermittedunderthetermsoftheCreativeCommonsAttribution-NonCommerciaI4.0International1.icense.www.cgdev.orgCenterforGlobalDevelopment.2024.TheviewsexpressedinCGDPol

8、icyPapersarethoseoftheauthorsandshouldnotbeattributedtotheboardofdirectors,fundersoftheCenterforGlobalDevelopment,ortheauthorsrespectiveorganizations.ContentsA. Backgroundandsummaryofargument1B. Theexceptionalpolicychallengesposedbyclimatechange7Theurgencytoaddresstheexceptionalrisksofclimatechange8

9、Theexceptionalsizeofthefinancingrequirements10Thecomplexityofthedomesticpolicychallenge11Theweaknessofdomesticaccountabilityforclimatechangepolicies12Thefailuresintheglobalsystemofaccountability13C. AmoreambitiousapproachtoRSFconditionality14Bestpracticeconditionality15MainfeaturesofRSFconditionalit

10、ysofar16AddressingtheshortcomingsofRSFconditionality17Issue1.MaximizingRSFeffectivenessthroughgreatertransparencyandaccountability17Proposal1.Establishanewmechanismfortransparencyandaccountability18Issue2.IncreasingRSFeffectivenessbyfocusonafew“IMF-focused”criticalactions21Proposal2.Focusmoreclearly

11、onafewcriticalactions22Issue3.IncreasingtheurgencyofRSFengagementwithasmanycountriesaspossible24Proposal3.Introducealow-accesscredittranchetotheRSF25TheparallelneedforamajorinitiativetostrengthenArticleIVsurveillanceforallmembers26References.271.istofBoxes1. Theescalatingrisksandcostsofclimatechange

12、82. Accountabilitygapsintheframeworkofinternationalcooperation13A. BackgroundandsummaryofargumentTheIMFformallyestablisheditsnewResilienceandSustainabilityTrust(RST)inApril2022withitsdeclaredpurpose,tohelpcountriesbuildresiliencetoexternalshocksandensuresustainablegrowth,contributingtotheirlong-term

13、balanceofpaymentsstability.SeeIMFstatementandpolicypaper(IMF,April18,2022)andAndrews,PlantandHickJIn,TheIMFsRSTHaSMetContributorsWishes-NowItMustMeetBorrowersNeeds!(CGDblog.May10,2022).AnOperationalGuidanceNotewasissuedinNovember2023(IMF,November28,2023).Thefocushassofarbeenexclusivelytoaddressthech

14、allengeOfclimatechangethoughpandemicpreparednesswasidentifiedasanotherareatobecovered,withthepossibilityofaddingothertopicsatalaterstage.Inall,143countriesweredeemedeligibleinprinciple.TheimmediateimpetusfortheIMF,sinitiativecameinthemidstoftheglobalpandemic.TheunprecedentedallocationinAugust2021ofs

15、ome$650billionworthofSpecialDrawingRights(SDRs)toIMFmembercountrieswasaccompaniedbyapledgefromthelargesteconomies-whohadnoneedofthelion,ssharetheyreceivedoftheadditionalSDRs-torecycleor*re-channe,$100billionworthofSDRstocountriesingreaterneedofthem.SeeG20Rome1.eadersDeclaration(G20,2021).Partwasenvi

16、sagedtobolstertheIMF,sPovertyReductionandGrowthFacility(PRGT)withsomescopealsotochannelthroughothermultilateralinstitutions.Some$44billionwastargetedforthenewRST,ofwhichsome$36billioncouldbelentoutwiththeremaindersetasidetoprovideagainstliquidityandcreditrisk.Bytheend-December2023,theRSThadsecuredto

17、talpledgesofSDR31.9billion($42.8billion),ofwhichSDR26.3billion($35.3billion)countstowardtheSDR33billionRSTfundraisingtarget($44billionattheprevailingexchangerate).Seeforg,enTopicsResilience-and-Sustainabllity-Trust;andalsohttps:/data.one.org/data-dives/sdr/Htracking-sdrchanneling-through-the-rstWith

18、amountssetasidefordepositandreserveaccounts,thefundraisingtargetwouldallowsomeSDR27billion($36billion)tobeavailableforloans.Sofar,almost$30billionisavailabletolend.TheResilienceandSustainabilityFacility(RSF)wascreatedasthe加ndinginstrumentfundedbytheRST.1.endingoperationsbeganinlate2022.ByOctober2022

19、theIMFhadfirmedupsufficientnancialcontributionsfromcreditorsanddeclaredthenewTrustoperational.SeestatementbytheManagingDirector(IMF,October12,2022).Subsequentlyitnegotiatedpolicyprogramswiththefirstrecipients,settingtheconditionsthatcountriesmustmeettosecureloanswithunusuallylong-term(20-year)maturi

20、ty.Byend-February2024,theIMFExecutiveBoardhadapprovedcommitmentstotaling$7.0billiontoCostaRiCa,Barbados,Rwanda,Bangladesh,Jamaica,Kosovo,Seychelles,Senegal,Niger,Kenya,Morocco,Moldova,CaboVerde,Benin,Mauritania,Paraguay,andCameroon.Thefirstdisbursementswerenotscheduledtobemadeforseveralmonthsafterin

21、itialapprovalanddependedonsubsequentIMFExecutiveBoardreview.Byend-February2024,only$1.4billionhadbeendisbursedtoninecountries,withafurther$3.4billiontotheseventeencountriessofarscheduledfor2024.Firstdisbursementsscheduledfor2023wereapprovedforRwandainMay;BarbadosandCostaRicainJune;JamaicainAugust；Ko

22、sovoinOctober；Seychelles,Bangladesh,andSenega)inDecember；andforKenyaInJanuary2024.Nigers2023disbursementawaitsapproval.Forupdatedtracking,seehttps:/data.one.org/data-dives/sdrntracking-sdr-channeling-through-the-rst.Nonetheless,gettingeventhisfarisanaccomplishmentandreflectstheIMFsabilitytoadaptitsf

23、inancinginstrumentstomeetnewneedsofitsmembercountries.TheIMFhashadtoovercomemajortechnical,legal,andfinancialhurdlesaswellasfindpolicyconsensusamongstshareholders.However,whatcomesnext-includingtheapproachtoconditionality-willbecrucialtodeterminingwhetherthisinitiativeisultimatelyasuccess.Acentralis

24、sueisthatthemetricsforsuccessarenotwellspecified,makingitdifficultfortheRSTtobefullyeffectiveuntiltheyaremadeclearandconditionsappropriatelygearedtowhattheIMFcanhelpdeliver.TheIMF,sapproachsofarseemstobetohopeforthebestbyprovidingadditionalliquiditysupportandbyspecifyingasconditionsvarioususefulcoun

25、try-ledpolicyreforms-somealreadyunderconsideration-thatplausiblycontributetotacklinglong-termstructuralproblemsandprospectivebalance-of-paymentsproblems.Thisapproachblursthreecompetingthoughnotexplicitobjectives.Themostimportantistosupportsubstantivepolicyreformincountriesfacingclimatechange.Twoothe

26、rsareimplicit:todisbursequicklytoalleviateliquidityconcerns;andtocontribute-defacto-todebtreprofilingfordevelopingcountriesintheyearstocome,objectivesthatareeasiertopursueatthemarginthroughtheRSFthanrelyingsolelyonregularIMFfacilities.However,specifyingmoreclearlytheIMF,sroleinthedifficulttaskofmeet

27、ingthefirstobjectiveisthekeytotheultimatesuccessoftheRST,andthefocusofthispaper.Forsome,aquickdisbursementofRSFfundswouldmarkonemeasureofsuccess.Bycontrast,noothermultilateralinstitutionhasyetmanagedtodeviseandimplementaschemewithsufficientshareholdersupporttorecycleSDRsatall,thoughtheAfricanDevelop

28、mentBank(AfDB)isfurthestadvanced.SeePlant,FundingHybridCapitalattheAfDBIstheBestDealforSDRDonors.(CGDblog.March9,2023).FurtherimpetuswasgivenduringtheIMFsAnnualMeetingsinOctober2023.AmetricofrapiddisbursementwouldbeunsurprisinggiventhecircumstancesunderwhichtheRSTwascreated.Manydevelopingcountriesfa

29、cedliquidityconstraintsandlackoffiscalspaceduringtheCOVID-19pandemic,inadditiontothedauntingfinancingrequirementsamountingtoseveraltrillionsofdollarseachyeartorestructuretheireconomiestoinvestinenergytransitionwhiletacklingclimatechangeandpreparingforfuturepandemics.Eachofthesechallengesentailsprese

30、ntorprospectivebalanceofpaymentsproblems,andtheRSFfundscanbeveryusefuladditionalresourcesforindividualcountries.Nonetheless,theamountspledgedtotheRSFareextremelymodestcomparedtothescaleofthefinancingneeds,muchofwhichwillcomefromtheprivatesectoraswellasotherofficialsources,bothexternalanddomestic.Ake

31、yroleforrapiddisbursementofRSFfunds,givingfinancialsupporttonationalpolicyintent,isthereforethesignalitsendsthatcancatalyzemuchlargerresourcesfromothersources.Besidesadesiretodisbursequickly,thedesignofRSFconditionalitysuggestsanadditionalifunstatedpurposetohelpreprofileacountryzsdebtserviceobligati

32、ons.RSFdisbursementsfinancesomenewupfrontbudgetexpenditurebutalsoprovideareservebuffer,sothattheRSFtopsupaccesstotheresourcesthatareprovidedbytherequiredregularIMFprogram.TheIMFsapproachthereforehastheeffectofmakingiteasierforcountriestoservicedebtthatwillbeduetotheIMFandothersinthenextfewyearswhenm

33、anyRSF-eligiblecountriesfacetheprospectofdebtdistressthatisheightenedbywar,pandemic,andclimatechange,inadditiontoanypolicyshortcomings.Sincethe20-yearmaturityofRSFloansexceedsthatforregularIMFandPRGTloans,theRSFwouldinessenceallowapartialreschedulingofdebtservicefallingduetotheIMFandothers.Thetempta

34、tiontopursuethisunstatedbenefitshouldnot,however,distractfromtryingtomaximizetheRSF,simpactonincreasinglong-termresiliencetoclimatechange(andtootherchallengesincludingpandemics).Fundamentally,thesuccessoftheRSFwilldependonthestrengthofthepoliciesthatcountriesundertaketobolstertheirresilience,andtheR

35、SFcontributioncomesfromthelinkbetweentheavailabilityofIMFfinancingandthenatureandspeedofpolicyactionthattheRSFloanswillhelptosupport.ThedesignofRSFprogramconditionswillthereforebekeytowhetherthenewTrustsucceedsinitspurpose.ArgumentsovertheappropriatedesignofRSFconditionalityarejustthelatestepisodein

36、alongsagaofcontroversiesoverIMFconditionalitypolicy,andoffrequentreviewsofitbytheIMFitselfThemostrecentwascompletedin2019,see*,2018ReviewofProgramDesignandCOnditiOnaIiy(IMFMay2019).AparticularlyeventfulandcontentiousperiodisdescribedinJamesBoughton,SilentRevolution:TheInternationalMonetaryFund1979-1

37、989(IMF,2001),pp557-636.InthecaseoftheRSF,thedebateoverwhetherconditions-includingthe195ReformMeasures(RMS)inthefirstseventeenprograms-arenecessaryorsufficient,ortoolenientortooburdensome,isheightenedbytheoriginalframingofthedesiretorecycleSDRstothosemostvulnerableasawaytomakethe2021SDRallocationmor

38、eequitable.Thepressuretodisbursemoneyquicklymightsuggestverylightconditionality,andthereiscertainlynoshortageofpolicyactionsrelatedtobuildingacountry,sresiliencethatcouldplausiblybeusedtojustifyquickdisbursementsifdesired.Moreover,someofthe143eligibleborrowingcountrieswillbeputoffiftheyperceivethere

39、quirementsimposedbycreditorstobetoostringent,includingtohaveaparallel“regular“IMFprogramorcreditline,giventhestigmathatanyagreementwiththeIMFevokes.Othercountrieswillstruggletogarnerthepoliticalwilltotakesubstantivepolicymeasuresonclimatemitigationoradaptationthatrequirethetime,skill,andsupporttobui

40、ldconsensusfordifficultdecisions.CreditorsareconcernedlesttooeasyRSFconditionalitywouldencouragecountriestobypassconditionalityusuallyrequiredunderregularIMFprograms,andbydoingsowouldweakentheprospectsofrepayingRSFloans.Applyingparallelandthereforetougherconditionalityhasbeenonewaythatcreditorsargue

41、willpreservethemreserveassetstatus“oftheon-lentSDRs.BasedontheagreedRSFmodalitiesandtheevidencefromearlycases,theaimsofrelativelyrapidfinancingandfacilitatingsubstantivechangewillbefurthered,butmodestly:therateofactualdisbursementsisslowzandtheimpactonresiliencedifficulttoquantify.Themodalitiesofthe

42、RSF,includingthephasednatureofdisbursementsandloanconditions,especiallytherequirementtohaveaconcurrentIMFprogramorcreditline,metthecreditors*requirementsandasaresulteventhecommittedSDRswillnotbedisbursedveryquickly.ForthefirstRSF-supportedreformprograms,thefirsttranchewasnotmadeavailableforsomefourm

43、onths(CostaRica)toninemonths(Bangladesh)afterExecutiveBoardapproval,withfulldisbursementspreadoutoverthreeyears,andcontingentonperformancenotonlyofagreedreformmeasuresundertheRSFbutalsooftheaccompanyingmacroeconomicprogram.Withthepresentlimitsonacountry,saccesstoRSFfunds,theapproximately$30billionno

44、wavailablewouldbedisbursedby2030onlyiftheearlypaceofapprovalsismaintainedandifallprogramsarefullyimplemented.1.imitsonindividualcountryaccessweresetinitiallyatthelesserofSDR1billionorISOpercentofIMFquota,withanormof75percent.Theaverageaccessforthefirstseventeenprogramswas$0.4billion(onaverage,112per

45、centofquota),withtwoeconomies(BangladeshandMorocco)cappedatSDR1billion($1.3billion)andsevenothersatthemaximum150percentofquota.Asimilaraverageprofilewouldrequiremorethan50additionalprogramstobeapprovedby2027todisburse$30billionby2030.Forcritiques,seeGuptaandBrown,*,HowCantheIMFsNew1.endingFacilityfo

46、rClimateandPandemicPreparednessBeMadeMoreEfFective?*(CGDblog,March29,2023);GUPtaandBrown,IMF1.endingUndertheResilienceandSustainabilityTrust：AnInitialAssessmen1.(CGDpolicypaper289,March28,2023；andGuptaandBrown,TheResilienceandSustainabilityFacilitysRecentProgramsStillFallShortofItsAmbitiousGoals.(CG

47、Dblog,August22.2023),whofocusonthelow-depthofreformmeasuressofar.SeealsoCitrinandSembene,IMFSupportforClimateResilienceinAfricaIsHelpful,ButMoreCanBeDone.(CGDblog,September22,2023)whoargueforgreateraccesstofinancing.Moreover,theearlycaseshavefocusedonlyonclimatechangeresilience,notyetonpandemicprepa

48、rednessthatwastheotherIssuehighlightedintheExecutiveBoarddecisionestablishingtheRSTinApril2022.Thedegreeofsubstantivechangeisinquestion,andthedangerwiththecurrentapproachisthattheIMFwilloverpromiseandunderachieveinitsbidtobolstercountries*long-termresilienceandsustainablegrowth.Theinitialcountryprog

49、ramsreflectanenormousamountoftechnicalworkandcommitmentatthenationallevel,andsignificantcooperationbetweentheIMFstaffandpartnerinstitutions,includingtheWorldBank.However,therearethreeconcernsabouttheeffectivenessofRSFconditionality.First,sinceagreementnowonReformMeasuresisonlypartofthegeneration-longprocessOfbuildingconsensusandadaptingpoliciessufficienttomeetanever-changingconcepto