外商直接投资能否带来溢出效应？外文翻译.docx

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1、外商直接投资能否带来溢出效应？外文翻译外文翻译原文Aretherepositivespilloversfromdirectforeigninvestment?MaterialSourceiJournalofDevelopmentEconomics42199351-74Author:MonaHaddad,AnnHarrisonManydevelopingcountriesnowactivelysolicitforeigninvestment,offeringincometaxholidays,importdutyexemptions?andsubsidiestoforeignfirms.Oner

2、easonforsubsidizingthesefirmsisthepositivespilloverfromtransferringtechnologytodomesticfirms.Thispaperemploysauniquefirm-leveldatasettotestforsuchspilloversintheMoroccanmanufacturingsector.Wefindevidencethatthedispersionofproductivityissmallerinsectorswithmoreforeignfirms.However,werejectthehypothes

3、isthatforeignpresenceacceleratedproductivitygrowthindomesticfirmsduringthesecondhalfofthe1980s.Usingdetailedinformationonquotasandtariffs,wealsorejectthepossibilityofadownwardbiasinestimatingtechnologyspilloversbecauseforeigninvestorsmaybeattractedtoprotecteddomesticmarkets1.IntroductiouThedisappear

4、anceofnonequitysourcesofforeigncapitalinthe1980shascreatedarenewedinterestindirectforeigninvestmentDFLDespitethecontroversiessurroundingthebenefitsandcostsofDFI,anumberofdevelopingcountrygovernmentshavenowchangedtheirpoliciesfromrestrictingtowardspromotingforeignInvestment.Somecountrieshaveactuallyt

5、iltedthebalancetowardsforeignfirmsbyofferingspecialincentives:inMexico,themaquiladorafirmspaynoincometaxes;inmuchoftheCaribbean,foreignfirmsreceiveincometaxholidays,importdutyexemptions,andsubsidiesforinfrastructure.Arethesesubsidiesjustified?OnebenefitoftencitedintheliteratureonthegainsfromDFI,apar

6、tfromthecapitalofteninflowsandadditionalemployment,isthenewtechnologybroughtinbyforeignfirms,itcouldjustifysometypeofsubsidy.ThismaybetherationableforgovermentpoliciesineconomicesasdiverseasTaiwanandBulgaria,whichtargetspecialtreatmentforforeignfirmsinhightechnologysectors.Technologytransferoccursth

7、roughmanydifferentavenues-newtechnologyisembodiedinimportedinputsandcapitalgoods,solddirectlythroughlicensingagreements,ortransmittedtoexporterswholearnaboutnewtechniquesfromtheirforeignbuyers.Inothercases,learningbydoingamongdomesticfirms,combinedwithinvestmentsinformaleducationandon-the-jobtrainin

8、g,iscritical.Noindividualsourceoftechnologyislikelytobethebest;countryexperiencesuggeststhatthemosteffectivediffusionofnewideasandprocessesprobablyinvolvesacombinationofallthesefactors.Foreigninvestmentplaysanunusualroleinseveralrespects,however.First,newtechnologymaynotbecommerciallyavailableandinn

9、ovatingfirmsmayrefusetoselltheirtechnologyvialicensingagreements.MansfieldandRomeo1980,forexample,foundthatthetechnologytransferredviamultinationalswasmuchnewerthanthetechnologysoldthroughlicensingagreements.Second,foreigninvestmentmayprovidethecompetitionnecessarytostimulatetechnologydiffusion,part

10、icularlyiflocalfirmsareprotectedfromimportcompetition.Third,foreigninvestorsmayprovideaformofworkertrainingwhichcannotbereplicatedindomesticfirmsorpurchasedfromabroad.Thetheoreticalliteratureonforeigninvestmentsuggeststhatforeigninvestorspossesssomesortofintangibleassetwhichcannoteasilybesold-suchas

11、managerialskills.TechnologydiffusionmayoccurthroughlaborturnoverasdomesticemployeesmovefromforeigntodomesticfirmsExistingcasestudiesofmultinationalbehaviordosuggestthatforeigninvestmentcouldbeanimportantsourceofspillovers.RheeandBelotl990presentanumberofdetailedcaseswhereforeigninvestorshaveactedase

12、xportcatalysts,insomecasesfuelingdomesticexportindustrywheretherewerenodomesticexportsatall.MansfieldandRomeo,however,foundthatonlyasmallshareofthe15multinationalsintheirsurveybelievedthatforeigninvestmenthastenedaccesstoprocesstechnologyforhostcountrycompetitors.MansfieldandRomeosuggestedthatmoreim

13、portantgainsfromforeigninvestmentwerelikelytobethroughcostsavingstodownstreamusersofnewproductsortechnologytransferredtoupstreamsupplier.Anumberofempiricalstudieshaveattemptedtodirectlymeasuretheso-calledspilloversfromforeigninvestment.Inanearlystudy,Cavel974testedfortheimpactofforeignpresenseonvalu

14、e-addedperworkerinAustraliandomestically-ownedmanufacturingsectors.CavesfoundthatthediparityBetweenhigherforeignanddomesticvalue-addeddisappearsastheforeignshareofsectorallaborrises,whichisconsistentwithpositivespilloversfromforeignpresence.Globermanl979replicatedCave,sfindingsl974usingsector-level,

15、cross-sectiondataforCanadianmanufacturingindustriesin1972.Globerman,however,wasabletocontrolexplicityforcapitalintensityinhisestimationofvalue-addedperworker.Theresultsindicateonlyaweakeffect-noneoftheproxiesforforeignpresenceinthesectoraresignificantatthe5percentlevel.Mostoftheempiricalworkonspillo

16、versfromforeigninvestmentindevelopingcountrieshasfocusedonMexico,whichgathersmanufacturingdatabyownershiptype.BlomstromandPersson1983reproduceGloberman,sstudyusing1970censusdatafor215Mexicanmanufacturingindustries.Controllingforcapitalintensity,scaleeffects,andworkerquality,BIomstromandPerssonfindth

17、atlaborproductivityissignificantlyhigherinsectorswhereforeignfirmsemployahighershareofthelaborforce.Blomstrom1986andWolff1989findfasterproductivitygrowthandfasterconvergenceofproductivitylevelsinsectorswhichhigherlevelsofforeignownership.Thispaper,whichexaminestheimpactofforeigninvestmentonfirmsinMo

18、rocco,smanufacturingsectorfrom1985through1989,contributestothisexistingliteratureintworespects.Thisisthefirst-sepecificattributessuchassize.Thepanelnatureofthedatawhichcombinecross-sectionandtimeseriesallowsustogobeyondcross-sectionanalysiscomparingpartialproductivitymeasuressuchaslaborproductivitya

19、crossdifferentfirms.Ourresultssuggestthatforeignfirmsexhibithigherlevelsoftotalfactorproductivity,buttheirrateofproductivitygrowthislowerthanthatfordomesticfirms.Atfirstglance,thiswouldappeartosupportthecatch-uphypothesis?domesticfirms,atlowerinitiallevelsofproductivity,areabletoincreaseefficiencyat

20、afasterrate.However,ourtestsonthepresenceofanyspilloversfromforeignpresenceshowthatalthoughdomesticfirmsexhibithigherlevelsofproductivityinsectorswithalargerforeignpresence,theydonotexhibithigerproductivitygrowthinthosesectorsSecond,weareabletousedetailedinformationonthelevelofquotaandtariffprotecti

21、ontotestwhetherthelackofanyspilbversstemsfromatendencyofforeignfirmstomovetowardsprotectedsectors.WedonotfindevidenceofsuchpositivespilloversineithertheprotectedorunprotectedsectorsSection2discussesthetradeandforeigninvestmentpoliciesinMoroccobeforeandduringregulatoryreforminthe1980s.Section3examine

22、stherelativeperformanceofdomesticfirmsandforeignfirms.Section4measuresthespilloversfromforeignpresenceonthelevel,growthrate,anddispersionofproductivityfordomestically-ownedfirms.Thissectionalsoextendstheanalysistoexaminewhethertechnologyspilloversarerelatedtothedegreeofimportprotection.Section5concl

23、udeswithadiscussionoftheimplicationsofthesefindingsforpoliciestowardsmultinationals2.Theregulatoryframework:Foreigninvestmentandtradepolicy2.1.ForeigninvestmentpolociesThefirstmajoractionagainstforeigninvestmentinMoroccotookplacein1973,whenthegovernmentpassedtheMoroccanizationDecree,whichrestrictedf

24、oreignownershipofcer6nindustrial,commercial,andserviceactivitiestonomorethan49perr;nt.Themainpurposeofthispolicywaspoliticalratherthaneconomic-toreducethedominantroleofFrenchfirmsintheMoroccaneconomy.ActivitiesfallingundertheMoroccanizationlawiIycludedtextiles,clothing,footwear,leatherproducts,trave

25、lgoods,toys,fishcanriingandpreserving,fertilizers,edibleoils,vegetablefibers,andprocessedfruitsacdvegetables.ThenegativeimpactofthislawonforeigninvestmentisevidentfromthefactthatevenenterprisesnotsubjecttothelawvoluntarilyhandedovertheircapitalsharetotheirMoroccanpartnersAmajorreformuftheinvestmentc

26、odewasundertakenin1983.ItallowedfullforeignownershipofMoroccancompaniesincertainsectorsespeciallymanufacturing,easedrestrictionsontherepatriationofcapitalanddividends,andintroducedfiscalandotherincentivesfordirectforeigninvest-ment.Thecodeguaranteediforeigninvestmentagainsttherisksofnationalizationa

27、ndexpropriaaion;iiunlimitedtransferofdividendsandprofitstoforeigninvestors;andiiitherepatriationofforeigninvestors,capitalandrelatedcaoitalgains.By1985,theMoroccanmajority-ownersrestrionnolongerappliedtoanysegmentintheindustrialsector,whichmeantthatforeignfirmscouldhaveanequityparticipationfomoretha

28、n49percent.Theinvestmentcodewasfurtherliberalizedin1988,administrativeproceduresgoverningtheapprovalofdirectforeigninvestmentweresimlifide,andrulessimilartothosegrantedtononresidentforeignerswereextendedtononredidentMoroccans.2.2.TradepolociesFollowingindependencein1956,Morocco,seconomicdevelopments

29、trategywasprimarilybasedonimport-substitutingindustrializationandagriculturalself-sufficiencyinaighlyprotecteddomesticmarket.Formorethantwodeeades,tradeandinustrialpoliciesinMoroccowerebasedonhightariffsandonquantitativerestrictionsinimports.Furthermore,duringthe1970s,theMoroccangovernmentexpandedgr

30、owththroughhighlevelsofpub!icspending,financedthroughforeignborrowingandrisingreceiptsfromphosphateexports.Thisculminatedinamajorpaymentcrisisin1983.Asaresult,thegovernmentintroducedoutward-orientedstructuraladjust-mentmeasuresdesignedtoeliminatethebiasagainstexportactivites,liberalizedtheimportregi

31、me,andenhancedtheallocativeroleofthefinancialsector.Thetradereformintroducedin1983calledfortheeventualeliminationoftheSpecialimportTariffSIT,auniformtariffleviedonthec.i.f.valueofimports,theloweringoftheimumcustomsdutyfrom400percentin1983to60percentin1984and45percentin1985,andareductioninquantitativ

32、erestrictions.Changesintheindustrialcodewerealsoundertakentopromoteexports.InJanuary1988,theSITandthecustomsstampdutyweremergedintowhatwascalledafiscallevyonimports,setat12.5percent.Contrarytothedecliningimumtarifftrendobservedsince1983,thefiscallevyactuallyexceededthesumofthetwoabolishedtaxes.Thisw

33、asintendedtogenerateadditionnalfiscalrevenueratherthantoprovideprtection.译文外商直接投资能否带来溢出效应?资料来源:开展经济学杂志42(1993)51-74作者:莫纳哈达德,安哈里森许多开展中国家现在正积极争取外国投资，提供假期所得税,进口关税减免,补贴给外国公司。其中一个原因是这些企业补贴,从国内企业转让技术，以积极的外溢。本文采用了独特的企业级数据集,测试在摩洛哥制造业等溢出效应。发现的证据说明,许多外国公司在部门的生产分工会更细。然后,有人产生了这样的假设：1980年后半期,外国公司加速了国内企业生产率的增长。对此

34、,我们是反对的。利用配额和关税上的详细信息,我们不能低估技术溢出效应,因为外国投资者可能倾向于保护国内市场。在上个世纪八十年代,外资来源的非股权化,重新掀起了外商直接投资的兴趣。尽管对外商直接投资的效益和本钱有诸多的争议,但是许多开展中国家政府已经改变限制外商投资的政策。实际上,一些国家已经倾斜于外国公司，提供他们特别的优惠。在墨西哥边境加工企业,不用支付所得税税款;在大局部加勒比地区,外国公司享受免缴所得税节日，进口关税豁免,和根底设施补贴。这些补贴是正确的吗？外商直接投资，除了资本流入和增加就业这些好处外,常常被文献引用的好处,是外国企业可以带来先进的新技术,这可以看作是某种类型的补贴。这

35、可能是政府政策的地区差异，就像台湾和保加利亚,对外国企业的高科技领域的特殊待遇。技术转让是通过许多不同的途径-新的技术表达在进口和资本货物、直接卖通过技术许可,或通过从国外买家学习新的技术传递给出口商。在其他情况下，在国内企业边做边学并结合正规教育和在职培训I,是至关重要的。个人资料来源的技术不可能是最好的，国家经验说明，新观念及流程最有效的扩散可能需要将这几个因素结合起来。然后,外国投资在一些方面发挥着不寻常的作用。首先,新科技不会商用和创新公司也许会拒绝销售他们的技术经许可协议。例如，曼斯菲尔德，罗密欧1980,新的技术转让是通过跨国公司进行的，而不是靠买卖技术许可。第二,外国投资会提供必

36、要的竞争,刺激技术扩散,特别是当本国企业受进口保护。第三,外国投资者可以提供一种员工培训I,而这种培训不能在国内的公司复制或从国外购置回来。外商投资的理论文献说明，外国投资者具有某种不容易被卖的无形资产,如管理技术。当本国员工从外国企业回到国内企业的时候,技术扩散可以通过人员流动实现。现有对跨国行为的研究案例说明外商投资可以成为重要的溢出效应的来源。让夫和贝勒特（1990）说明:在许多情况下，外国投资者都担当出口催化剂的角色;甚至,在某些情况下,刺激本没有出口的加工企业加速出口。然而,曼斯菲尔德和罗密欧发现,在他们调查的15个跨国公司中，只有一小局部认为,外商直接投资的进入刺激东道国技术的提高

37、。曼斯菲尔德和罗密欧说明：更重要的外商投资收益可能通过节约本钱从下游新产品、或技术的使用者转移到上游供给商。一些实证研究己经试图被用于估测外商直接投资所带来的溢出效应。在早期的研窕中，凯夫（1974年）在澳大利亚国内拥有的制造业部门中，对因为外资存在而产生的每个工人增加值的影响进行了测试。凯夫发现,随着劳动部门资本的增加，外资和国内资本增值的差距将会逐渐消失,这与外资存在的溢出效应是一致的。歌罗伯门（1979）与凯夫在1974年的发现一脉相承,运用了加拿大制造业在1972年的同部门,跨部门的数据。然而,歌罗伯门能够对在资本密度里的每个员工增值准确的估测控制。结果说明，只有在5个百分点的，因外资

38、存在的代理而产生的微弱影响能力,是具有重要意思的。大局部关于开展中国家的外资溢出效应的实证研究主要集中在墨西哥，它集中了所有制类型的制造业数据。布罗姆斯托和佩尔森（1983）复制了歌罗伯门的研究,利用了1970年215个墨西哥制造企业的普查数据。布罗姆斯托和佩尔森还发现,除了对资本密集度,规模效应和员工素质控制很重要外,劳动生产率在外国公司雇佣较高份额的劳动力的部门,会更高。布罗姆斯托（1986）和沃尔夫（1989）发现在外资持股的水平较高时,生产率提高和行业生产率收敛会更快。本文,通过对摩洛哥1985年到1989年制造业部门外商投资对企业影响的研究,主要有两个方面的成果。这是第一个具体奉献,如大小等。该面板性质的数据（结合了横截面和时间序列）使我们能够横向分析比拟一局部不同公司的生产率措施（比方劳动生产率）O研究结果说明，外国公司的全要素生产率水平较高，但是其生产率增长速度比国内企业低。乍一看,这似乎支持这样一个假说：国内企业初始生产率较低,能够以更快的速度提高效率。然后,对外国存在溢出效应的研究说明，尽管国内企业与外国存在结合使部门生产率水平得到提高,但是他们并没有带来这些部门生产率的增长。第二个成果是,我们能够使用配额和关税保护的详细资料,去测试从外商企业这个趋势变成保护部门会不会减少外资溢出效应。我们还没发现任何受保护或不受保护部门而产生的积极溢出效应的证据O